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INTRODUCTION 
ncreasing the Social Security full retirement age is back on the 
political agenda.1  In December 2010, President Obama’s 
bipartisan National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform 
(Fiscal Commission)2 recommended linking the retirement age to 
 
1 The full retirement age is the age at which a worker can claim full benefits.  See infra 
Part II.B.1 (discussing the full retirement age); see also Part II.B (providing an overview 
of the benefits calculation). 
2 President Obama created the Fiscal Commission by executive order to come up with 
recommendations “to improve the fiscal situation in the medium term and to achieve fiscal 
sustainability over the long run.”  Exec. Order No. 13,531, 75 Fed. Reg. 7927 (Feb. 23, 
2010).  The Fiscal Commission’s December 2010 report included recommendations on 
much more than just Social Security reform.  The report contained recommendations on 
measures that would help reduce the national deficit, including spending caps, budget cuts, 
and tax reform.  See NAT’L COMM’N ON FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY & REFORM, THE 
MOMENT OF TRUTH 14 (2010) [hereinafter FISCAL COMM’N, THE MOMENT OF TRUTH]. 
I
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increases in longevity—in effect, raising the age from its current cap 
of sixty-seven to sixty-nine by 2075.3  Increasing the retirement age 
was not the only Social Security reform proposed by the Fiscal 
Commission, but it is likely the most controversial because it reduces 
benefits. 
Decreasing tax revenues and increasing costs are forcing legislators 
to propose strong measures to reform Social Security.4  For the first 
time in over two decades,5 the projected revenue generated from 2010 
payroll taxes was insufficient to pay outgoing benefits.6  
Consequently, the U.S. Department of Treasury has to make up the 
difference.7  The timing could not have been worse.  The U.S. 
government faces historic budget deficits,8 a declining tax base,9 
increased government spending,10 and a weak economy.11  External 
 
3 FISCAL COMM’N, THE MOMENT OF TRUTH, supra note 2, at 50; see infra notes 226–
28 and accompanying text (providing details on the Fiscal Commission’s plan regarding 
the retirement age).  The indexing proposal could potentially raise the normal retirement 
age beyond sixty-nine.  See infra note 226 and accompanying text. 
4 The term “Social Security” in its common usage refers to the Old-Age, Survivors, and 
Disability Insurance (OASDI) program.  The Social Security Administration runs the Old-
Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) program and the Disability Insurance (DI) program.  
Unless otherwise noted, this Article discusses only the OASI program, which provides 
monthly income to “retired workers and their families and to survivors of deceased 
workers.”  BD. OF TRS., FED. OLD-AGE & SURVIVORS INS. & FED. DISABILITY INS. TRUST 
FUNDS, THE 2010 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL OLD-
AGE AND SURVIVORS INSURANCE AND FEDERAL DISABILITY INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS 1 
(2010) [hereinafter BOARD OF TRUSTEES, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT]. 
5 See Performance of Social Security Trust Funds 1937–2006, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 
http://www.ssa.gov/history/trustfunds.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2011) (detailing historic 
performance regarding income and costs associated with Social Security). 
6 BOARD OF TRUSTEES, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 2. 
7 The difference is paid through the Social Security Administration OASDI Trust Fund, 
which at the end of the 2009 fiscal year held $2.3 trillion.  Id. at 5.  However, because the 
trust fund is invested entirely in nonmarketable U.S. government bonds, Treasury, in 
effect, has to pay out interest on the bonds to the Social Security Administration in order to 
fund benefits.  See infra notes 29–40 and accompanying text. 
8 GENE L. DODARO, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-483T, U.S. 
GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL STATEMENTS: FISCAL YEAR 2009 AUDIT HIGHLIGHTS 
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES AND UNSUSTAINABLE LONG-TERM FISCAL 
PATH 11 (2010). 
9 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE 2009 FINANCIAL REPORT 
OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, at iii (2009) (stating that, for the 2009 fiscal year, federal 
government tax revenue—personal income tax, payroll tax, and corporate tax—declined 
$463 billion to approximately $2.2 trillion because of the recession and tax changes 
provided by the government stimulus programs). 
10 Id. at iii–iv (stating that, although the government reported decreased net costs in 
fiscal year 2009, spending actually increased, and the reduction in cost was due to a re-
estimation of future liabilities by the Department of Veterans’ Affairs). 
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pressure is also mounting.  The International Monetary Fund has 
suggested that the United States reduce Social Security benefits in 
order to lower its deficit.12  Social Security is an easy target for 
budget cutters “partly because of its size and partly because it is often 
mistakenly characterized as an out-of-control entitlement.”13 
It is widely acknowledged that reform proposals for Social Security 
require bipartisan support,14 and getting agreement between the 
political parties on this issue has historically been difficult.15  
Increasing the Social Security retirement age is one benefit cut that 
found traction among both Democrats and Republicans in 2010.16  
While increasing the retirement age is not a panacea to the problems 
Social Security faces, it could make a significant improvement to the 
system’s financing.  Proposals to increase the full retirement age 
might reduce the long-term Social Security deficit anywhere from 
18% to one-third, depending on how the change is implemented.17 
 
11 OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF 
PROGRAM, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS: APRIL 20, 2010, at 5 (2010), available at 
http://www.sigtarp.gov/reports/congress/2010/April2010_Quarterly_Report_to_Congress 
.pdf (stating that, while the financial crisis that started in 2007 appeared stabilized by 
2010, there was still uncertainty about the economic outlook for the U.S. economy). 
12 Tom Barkley, IMF Urges U.S. to Consider Higher Taxes, Social Security Cuts, 
WALL ST. J., July 8, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870360900 
4575354891924005002.html. 
13 Nancy J. Altman, Social Security and Intergenerational Justice, 77 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1383, 1397 (2009). 
14 Kathryn L. Moore, The Future of Social Security: Principles to Guide Reform, 41 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 1061, 1087 (2008). 
15 Jackie Calmes, Elephant in the Room: Budget Wish Lists Come and Go, But 
‘Entitlements’ Outweigh All, WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 2006, at A1. 
16 As the Democratic House Majority Leader in 2010, Steny Hoyer stated that Congress 
“could and should consider a higher retirement age.”  Press Release, Office of Democratic 
Whip Steny Hoyer, Majority Leader Hoyer Delivers Speech on Deficit Reduction at Third 
Way Event (June 22, 2010), available at http://democraticwhip.house.gov/content 
/majority-leader-hoyer-delivers-speech-deficit-reduction-third-way-event.  At nearly the 
same time, Republican House Minority Leader John Boehner tentatively supported raising 
the age.  Sam Stein, Boehner, Pence: Raising Social Security Retirement Age an Option, 
HUFFINGTON POST, Aug. 8, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/08/08/boehner     
-pence-social-security-retirement-age_n_674793.html. 
17 U.S. SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, SOCIAL SECURITY MODERNIZATION: 
OPTIONS TO ADDRESS SOLVENCY AND BENEFIT ADEQUACY, S. REP. NO. 111-187, at 52–
53 (2010).  The Fiscal Commission’s retirement age proposal by itself would improve the 
Social Security funding deficit by 18%.  FISCAL COMM’N, THE MOMENT OF TRUTH, supra 
note 2, at 54.  However, the Fiscal Commission’s proposed Social Security reforms were 
not limited to increasing the retirement age.  For details on the complete proposal, see 
infra notes 82–83 and accompanying text. 
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Despite some agreement on both sides of the aisle in Congress, the 
issues surrounding the retirement age remain controversial.18  
Proponents maintain that longer life expectancies justify an increase 
in the retirement age.19  Opponents argue that increasing the 
retirement age would adversely affect certain subpopulations that 
have shorter life spans, such as the poor, workers with physically 
demanding jobs, persons who did not complete high school, and 
African Americans.20  The disagreement over the retirement age is 
not new, but recent reports on retirement trends have injected new 
vigor into the debate.  In the last five years, economists have released 
several detailed reports on the retirement age;21 however, the last law 
review article entirely dedicated to a detailed analysis of the 
retirement age was published nearly ten years ago.22 
This Article reassesses the policy option of increasing the 
retirement age, considering recently published studies on longevity, 
capacity to work, labor force participation, and poverty rates.  
Additionally, the Article considers recent work in behavioral 
economics in order to craft policy initiatives that result in a secure 
retirement.  Part I of this Article analyzes the funding crisis facing 
Social Security and puts it into the context of the larger budget 
challenges facing the federal government.  Part II discusses the 
history of retirement age provisions in the Social Security Act and 
presents a descriptive analysis of the current law.  Part III considers 
the main arguments—pro and con—concerning the retirement age as 
 
18 The full retirement age was last raised with the passage of the 1983 Amendments to 
the Social Security Act.  Social Security Amendments of 1983, H.R. 1900, 98th Cong. 
(1983).  However, proposals to further increase the age were made by a majority of the 
1994–1996 Social Security Advisory Council.  Kathryn L. Moore, Raising the Social 
Security Retirement Ages: Weighing the Costs and Benefits, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 544, 559–60 
(2001). 
19 See infra notes 148–58 and accompanying text (discussing the arguments set forth by 
advocates of an age increase). 
20 See infra notes 159–61 and accompanying text (discussing the arguments made by 
opponents of an age increase). 
21 Many studies have been conducted under the auspices of the Retirement Research 
Consortium, a group of three research centers that receive funding from the Social 
Security Administration to conduct research related to the agency’s mission.  See 
Retirement Research Consortium, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/policy/rrc/index 
.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2011). 
22 While recent articles have discussed the retirement age, Kathryn Moore wrote the 
most thorough article in the law review literature in 2001.  See Moore, supra note 18.  
Much of Professor Moore’s analysis, such as her account of the legislative history of the 
retirement age provisions, remains relevant and need not be replicated here.  See id.  This 
Article analyzes studies published since Professor Moore’s article was written. 
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well as an analysis of values that should guide reform.  The extent to 
which the Social Security deficit is affected by various proposals is 
discussed in Part IV, and Part V analyzes the economic effects on 
workers.  Employment trends and ability to work are analyzed in 
Parts VI and VII, respectively.  Last, policy recommendations are 
made in Part VIII. 
I 
THE SOCIAL SECURITY FUNDING CRISIS 
The Social Security Administration (SSA) predicts that the 
combined Old-Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance (OASDI) trust 
funds will be insolvent by 2037.23  This figure combines data for two 
programs that the SSA administers—the Old-Age, Survivors (OASI) 
program that is generally referred to as “Social Security” and the 
Disability Insurance program.24  News media predictions of 
insolvency often refer to the combined OASDI trust funds for both 
programs, though each program is distinct and has separate funding 
sources.  This Article pertains to OASI, which I generically refer to as 
Social Security.  When looked at separately, the Disability Insurance 
program will be exhausted by 2018—much earlier than OASI, which 
by itself has an exhaustion date of 2040.25 
Despite years of knowledge about the shortfall facing Social 
Security, Congress has lacked the political will to institute significant 
changes.26  Little substantive reform to the retirement age has been 
made since the Social Security Amendments of 1983 (1983 
Amendments),27 which adjusted the retirement age, increased the 
payroll tax, and established other changes affecting benefits.28  In 
order to put the policy option of increasing the retirement age into 
context, it is first important to understand the financing problem that 
 
23 BOARD OF TRUSTEES, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 2–3. 
24 The OASI program pays benefits to retirees, their families, and survivors, whereas 
Disability Insurance provides benefits “to disabled workers and their families.”  Id. at 1. 
25 Id. at 3. 
26 Kathryn L. Moore, Reforming Retirement Systems: Why the French Have Succeeded 
When Americans Have Not, 22 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 251, 289 (2005). 
27 Social Security Amendments of 1983, H.R. 1900, 98th Cong. (1983). 
28 One important reform to the retirement earnings test was made in 2000.  See infra 
notes 125–26 and accompanying text.  For a legislative history of amendments to the 
Social Security Act since 1983, see Social Security Related Legislation Enacted Since 
1983, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/legislation/history/ (last visited Feb. 18, 
2010). 
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Social Security faces and the forces driving reform efforts.  The 
answers are found not only in the population data and the current 
economic climate but also within the structural system of Social 
Security financing—a system called pay-as-you-go (PAYGO). 
A.  The Breakdown in PAYGO 
Under PAYGO, the payroll tax levied on the younger working 
generation is the principal source of revenue to pay benefits for the 
older retired generation.29  However, the payroll tax is not the only 
income source for the SSA.  In the 2009 fiscal year, the SSA received 
$698.2 billion in revenue from three sources: (1) payroll taxes 
provided 82%,30 (2) income taxes levied on Social Security benefits 
accounted for 3%,31 and (3) interest earned on government bonds held 
in the trust fund yielded 15%.32  In any given year, most of the 
income (79.8% in 2009) is immediately paid out in benefits.33  Some 
of the revenue also goes to pay administrative costs ($3.4 billion in 
2009) and to help fund retirement for railroad workers ($3.7 billion in 
2009).34 
Any surplus accumulates in the Social Security Trust Fund—a 
rainy day fund that is tapped only when tax revenues in any given 
year are not enough to pay benefits.35  The Social Security Act 
mandates that the trust fund invest all surplus money in non-
marketable special issue U.S. government bonds.36  In 2009, the 
difference between payroll tax revenues and benefits was $13.2 
 
29 This statement simplifies the reality of PAYGO because some older workers stay in 
the workforce and therefore are still contributing to the system through payroll taxes.  
Additionally, benefits are paid to some younger beneficiaries who are eligible as 
dependents.  BOARD OF TRUSTEES, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 2. 
30 See id. at 5.  Payroll tax includes the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) and 
the Self Employment Contributions Act (SECA) taxes assessed on income for workers 
who are subject to Social Security rules.  U.S. SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, supra 
note 17, at 26. 
31 See BOARD OF TRUSTEES, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 5; see also U.S. 
SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, supra note 17, at 28 (stating that the benefits received 
under Social Security are levied only on taxpayers with incomes above a certain 
threshold). 
32 See BOARD OF TRUSTEES, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 5. 
33 See id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 5–6. 
36 BARBARA D. BOVBJERG, U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/T-AIMD/HEHS-
98-152, SOCIAL SECURITY FINANCING: IMPLICATIONS OF STOCK INVESTING FOR THE 
TRUST FUND, THE FEDERAL BUDGET, AND THE ECONOMY 3 (1998). 
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billion, which was added to the trust fund balance.37  The interest 
earned on the trust fund in 2009 amounted to $107.9 billion38—an 
effective rate of 4.8%39—and by the end of the fiscal year, the 
balance held in the trust fund was pegged at $2.3 trillion.40 
PAYGO systems are not an ideal way of financing retirement 
funds for countries with aging populations.41  One metric used to 
predict the solvency of PAYGO systems is the worker-beneficiary 
ratio, which measures the number of workers paying into the system 
per beneficiary.  When the predicted worker-beneficiary ratio drops, 
the change potentially indicates less money available to pay out 
benefits and acts as a red flag signaling a financing problem.42 
Declining birth rates, longer life expectancies, and the bulge in the 
population created by the baby boom generation have led to a 
significant decline in the worker-beneficiary ratio.43  Between 1974 
and 2008, the ratio of workers to beneficiaries remained steady—
fluctuating at between 3.2 and 3.4 workers per beneficiary.44  In 2009, 
the ratio dropped to 3.0 due to the high rate of unemployment during 
the recession.45  Even if the economy recovers, the worker-
beneficiary ratio will continue to drop because of the retiring baby 
boom generation.  The SSA predicts the ratio to be at 2.1 by 2035 
with further declines expected due to increasing longevity.46 
Additionally, SSA revenue from the payroll tax has not been as 
high as originally predicted because of a spike in unemployment that 
 
37 See BOARD OF TRUSTEES, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 5 (stating that tax 
revenue in 2009 was $570.4 billion and that $557.2 billion was paid out in benefits). 
38 Id. 
39 Trust Fund Data: Effective Interest Rates, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov 
/OACT/ProgData/effectiveRates.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2011). 
40 BOARD OF TRUSTEES, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 5.  The Social 
Security Act provides a formula that sets the rate of the special issue bonds based on an 
“average market yield on marketable interest-bearing securities of the Federal 
government.”  Interest Rate Formula for Special Issues, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., http://www 
.ssa.gov/OACT/ProgData/intrateformula.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2011). 
41 See generally Wade Donald Pfau, Reforming Social Security: Issues and Challenges 
for Personal Retirement Accounts, 19 E. & W. STUD. 215 (2007). 
42 However, a decrease in the worker-beneficiary ratio does not necessarily mean that 
less revenue is paid into the system if the reduction in workers is offset by increases in 
productivity.  See Neil H. Buchanan, Social Security and Government Deficits: When 
Should We Worry?, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 257, 288 (2007). 
43 BOARD OF TRUSTEES, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 2–3. 
44 Id. at 10. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
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started when the subprime financial crisis began in 2007.  For the first 
time since 1983, the projected revenue from payroll taxes in 2010 did 
not cover the cost of benefits.47  Consequently, the government will 
need to dip into the Social Security Trust Fund reserves in order to 
keep sending out checks to the roughly 42 million Americans who 
rely on benefits.48 
Tapping into the trust fund at this time is how a rainy day fund is 
designed to work.  The trust builds up savings for those periods of 
time when tax revenues are down.  Theoretically, the system currently 
runs a surplus when taking into account all sources of revenue—e.g., 
including the interest earned in the trust fund portfolio.  One problem 
is that the trust fund portfolio is entirely invested in non-marketable, 
special issue U.S. bonds.49  Redeeming the bonds to pay benefits 
means that Treasury has a net outflow as to the Social Security 
program.  In order to keep the status quo, Treasury will have to find 
some source other than the payroll tax to pay Social Security 
benefits.50 
However, Treasury is already under pressure given increased costs 
and lower tax revenue.  For the government’s overall general budget 
(excluding Social Security) in the 2009 fiscal year, Treasury reported 
that the general deficit rose from $455 billion in 2008 to $1.4 trillion 
in 2009.51  Net operating costs also rose about 30% to $1.3 trillion in 
the same period.52  The reasons for the general financing shortfall are 
well known.  The United States faced declining tax revenues because 
of the 2007–2009 recession and tax cuts passed as part of a stimulus 
package.  Costs went up in part because of increased government 
spending through the programs passed to address the economic 
downturn—principally the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 
 
47 See id. at 38, 143–44. 
48 See id. at 2 (stating that, in 2009, there were “36 million retired workers and 
dependents” plus “6 million survivors of deceased workers” receiving benefits from the 
OASI program). 
49 If the trust fund were diversified—invested in a portfolio of stocks, bonds, and other 
assets in the same way that pension funds are normally invested—Treasury could sell off 
some assets in the trust fund in order to pay benefits.  For an analysis of the potential of 
diversifying the trust fund into a broader portfolio, see Benjamin A. Templin, Full 
Funding: The Future of Social Security, 22 J.L. & POL. 395, 432–33 (2006), and Benjamin 
A. Templin, The Public Trust in Private Hands: Social Security and the Politics of 
Government Investment, 96 KY. L.J. 369, 400–01 (2008). 
50 See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 9, at 11–14. 
51 Id. at i. 
52 Id. 
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2008 (EESA)53 and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 
2009 (ARRA).54  In the short term, the government’s options to pay 
interest on the bonds held in the Social Security Trust Fund are 
limited and include (1) cutting other government spending and 
diverting that money to Social Security, (2) borrowing money by 
issuing bonds on the public market, or (3) increasing the money 
supply (i.e., printing more money) thus risking inflation.  None of 
these options are particularly attractive or practical in the long term. 
The immediate funding crisis is expected to get better in the short 
term but will soon worsen as more of the baby boom generation 
retires.  If the economy recovers and payroll tax revenues rise, the 
SSA estimates that the program’s costs should be financed through 
the payroll tax without resorting to the trust fund by 2012.55  
However, that short-term recovery may never happen.  After the SSA 
released its predictions, the Federal Reserve lowered its expectations 
on the recovery and predicted that unemployment levels would 
continue to stay high through 2012.56  Even if the SSA is correct in its 
estimates and tax revenues increase in the short term, the incoming 
payroll tax revenues may still be insufficient to pay benefits by 2015 
because more workers will begin to retire and there are fewer 
replacement workers to pay into the system.57  By the time most baby 
boomers have retired in 2040, the OASI Trust Fund will be 
exhausted.58 
 
53 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 
3765. 
54 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115.  
Most of the money spent under the EESA was in the form of investments through the 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) and other programs; therefore, a portion, but not 
all, is expected to be repaid to Treasury.  Under a theory of Keynesian economics, the 
spending programs under the ARRA—although not literally investments—will also result 
in a return to the government in the form of taxes if the government spending works to 
stimulate the economy and increase gross domestic product (GDP).  For a discussion of 
the EESA and ARRA as tools of Keynesian economics, see Benjamin A. Templin, The 
Government Shareholder: Regulating Public Ownership of Private Enterprise, 62 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 1127 (2010). 
55 See BOARD OF TRUSTEES, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 2–3, 38. 
56 Neil Irwin, Fed Lowers Economic Expectations for 2011, WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 
2010, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/political-economy/2010/11/fed_officials_expect 
_9_percent.html. 
57 BOARD OF TRUSTEES, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 2–3. 
58 Id. 
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Insolvency, in the context of Social Security, does not mean that 
benefit payments will stop entirely.59  Once the combined OASI and 
Disability Insurance trust funds are exhausted in 2037, the projected 
payroll tax will fund only 78% of the projected benefits.60  The SSA 
is prohibited from borrowing and can pay out benefits only to the 
extent that it has revenue.61  Consequently, one solution to the 
financing crisis will be to simply reduce benefits by 22% when the 
trust fund is exhausted in 2037.62 
B.  The Politics of the Government Deficit 
Given the limited options to finance benefits, the drive in 
Washington to either reduce Social Security benefits or raise taxes has 
gained momentum.63  In February 2010, President Obama established 
by executive order the bipartisan National Commission on Fiscal 
Responsibility and Reform (Fiscal Commission), which was charged 
to report in December 2010 with recommendations to reduce the 
federal deficit.64  President Obama instructed the Fiscal Commission 
that “‘everything has to be on the table,’” including Social Security.65  
One way to reduce the overall federal deficit is to delay Treasury’s 
obligation to pay interest on the bonds in the Social Security Trust 
Fund by reducing costs or raising the payroll tax. 
The Fiscal Commission proposed a number of reforms for Social 
Security, including increasing the retirement age.66  Not every 
member of the Fiscal Commission was behind the recommendations.  
In fact, only eleven members of the eighteen-person commission 
voted to adopt the measures—falling short of the fourteen people 
needed to bring the overall plan to a vote in Congress.67  Congress 
 
59 U.S. SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, supra note 17, at 76. 
60 BOARD OF TRUSTEES, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 9. 
61 Altman, supra note 13, at 1397–98. 
62 BOARD OF TRUSTEES, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 20–21. 
63 See, e.g., Jackie Calmes, Panel Seeks Social Security Cuts and Higher Taxes, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 10, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/11/us/politics/11fiscal.html?_r=1 
&partner=rss&emc=rss. 
64 Exec. Order No. 13,531, supra note 2. 
65 Jackie Calmes, Obama Tells Debt Commission ‘Everything Has to Be on the Table,’ 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/28/business/economy 
/28fiscal.html. 
66 See FISCAL COMM’N, THE MOMENT OF TRUTH, supra note 2, at 54. 
67 Jonathan Weisman & Damian Paletta, Majority of Panel Backs Deficit Plan, WALL 
ST. J., Dec. 4, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703989004575652 
621383159484.html. 
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member Stephanie Condon, a dissenter on the Fiscal Commission, 
condemned the benefit cuts to Social Security and offered up a new 
plan, mainly consisting of payroll tax increases on the salaries of 
high-wage earners.68 
Congress has not been idle either.  On the eve of the seventy-fifth 
anniversary of the signing of the Social Security Act69 in August 
2010, some Congress members initiated new calls for reform.  
Hearings were held by the House Subcommittee on Social Security 
and the Senate Finance Committee,70 and reports on the funding crisis 
were released by the Senate Special Committee on Aging,71 the 
Congressional Budget Office,72 and the Government Accountability 
Office,73 among others.  The electorate is also primed for reform, 
with one poll showing that 90% of voters (including large majorities 
from both parties plus independents) think it is important that 
Congress act by 2011.74 
Dozens of reform proposals have been discussed and analyzed by 
the SSA, academics, and think tanks.75  Reform proposals generally 
fall into one of four categories: (1) tax increases,76 (2) benefit cuts,77 
 
68 Stephanie Condon, Rep. Jan Schakowsky Counters Deficit Commission Leaders’ 
Plan with More Liberal Plan, CBSNEWS.COM, Nov. 16, 2010, http://www.cbsnews.com 
/8301-503544_162-20023006-503544.html. 
69 Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935). 
70 The House Subcommittee on Social Security conducted hearings on July 15, 2010.  
Press Release, Chairman Pomeroy Announces a Hearing on Social Security at 75 Years: 
More Necessary Now Than Ever (July 8, 2010), available at http://democrats.waysand 
means.house.gov/press/PRArticle.aspx?NewsID=11256.  The Senate Finance Committee 
addressed the same issues on the same day.  See Choosing to Work During Retirement and 
the Impact on Social Security, U.S. SENATE COMM. ON FIN. (July 15, 2010), 
http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/hearing/?id=994b091c-5056-a032-52a6-97cee60ebe87. 
71 The Senate Special Committee on Aging Chair, Herb Kohl, concluded that “Congress 
should enact modest changes to Social Security in the near future in order to bring its long-
term financing into balance and improve benefits for those who need them most.”  U.S. 
SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, supra note 17, at V. 
72 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CBO PUB. NO. 4140, SOCIAL SECURITY POLICY OPTIONS 
30–31 (2010), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/115xx/doc11580/07-01-SSOptions 
_forWeb.pdf. 
73 DODARO, supra note 8, at 11. 
74 VIRGINIA P. RENO & JONI LAVERY, NAT’L ACAD. OF SOC. INS., ECONOMIC CRISIS 
FUELS SUPPORT FOR SOCIAL SECURITY: AMERICANS’ VIEWS ON SOCIAL SECURITY 5, 15 
(2009). 
75 The SSA provides funding to the Retirement Research Consortium, a group of three 
institutions that conduct studies related to Social Security and retirement issues.  See 
Retirement Research Consortium, supra note 21. 
76 Tax increase proposals include raising the payroll tax, increasing the mandatory cap, 
or designating that the estate tax pay for Social Security.  See Actuarial Publications: 
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(3) diversifying the trust fund,78 and (4) structural changes.79  While 
some proposals claim to completely eliminate the deficit, such 
proposals tend to have a disproportionate effect on some groups.80 
As with most Social Security policy proposals, the retirement age 
increases do not—by themselves—solve the financing problem.  Most 
analysts agree that any long-term fix will have to include some mix of 
reform proposals including both reductions to benefits and a 
concurrent increase in taxes.81  The Fiscal Commission’s proposed 
Social Security reforms include a number of measures, some of which 
would raise costs.  Recommended reforms from the bipartisan 
commission include establishing a minimum benefit to combat 
poverty among the elderly, broadening the tax base to include 90% of 
taxable payroll, increasing the progressivity by reducing benefits for 
higher-income workers, changing the method by which cost-of-living 
adjustments are made, and moving new state and local government 
employees into the Social Security system, among others.82  With 
these measures, the Social Security system is expected to have a 
surplus.83 
There is also the possibility that Congress will be able to agree on 
only a partial fix for the Social Security deficit.  The problem in 
 
Summary of Provisions That Would Change the Social Security Program, SOC. SEC. 
ADMIN., www.ssa.gov/OACT/solvency/provisions/summary.html (last visited Feb. 20, 
2011). 
77 The number of benefit-cut proposals that have been discussed are too numerous to 
mention for purposes of this Article; they include not only increasing the retirement age 
but also across-the-board reductions in benefits.  See id. 
78 Diversifying the Social Security Trust Fund into a portfolio that contains equities 
could, according to one estimate, eliminate up to one-third of the deficit over time.  U.S. 
SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, supra note 17, at 50–51. 
79 Structural changes include the personal accounts proposal put forward by President 
Bush in 2001, which would have changed Social Security from a defined benefit plan to a 
defined contribution plan.  See Kathryn L. Moore, Social Security Reform: Fundamental 
Restructuring or Incremental Change?, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 341, 345 (2007).  
Commentators do not think the possibility of an ownership interest is meaningful enough 
to compel taxpayers to take on the risk of lower returns.  See Pfau, supra note 41. 
80 For example, one proposal would completely wipe out the deficit by eliminating the 
payroll cap and applying the payroll tax to all earnings without any increase in benefits for 
high earners.  U.S. SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, supra note 17, at 52–53.  
However, such an approach would be inconsistent with the generally accepted principles 
of Social Security that benefits be a wage-related earned right.  See Moore, supra note 14, 
at 1066–67 (discussing the principles behind Social Security). 
81 Moore, supra note 14, at 1078–82. 
82 FISCAL COMM’N, THE MOMENT OF TRUTH, supra note 2, at 49–53. 
83 Id. at 54. 
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Social Security reform is not so much creating a solution as it is 
getting agreement on the type of reform.84  Raising the retirement age 
is a reform that some Democratic and Republican leaders have agreed 
on.85  However, the issue ignites controversy.  Even among policy 
analysts who generally agree, there is strong disagreement on 
increasing the retirement age.86 
II 
RETIREMENT AGE IN THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 
In the original Social Security Act passed in 1935, the age to start 
claiming benefits was simply sixty-five for everyone.87  However, 
more complexity was introduced as the program progressed, and the 
last major revision affecting the full retirement age was made with the 
1983 Amendments.  Under the current law, the age at which a worker 
starts to claim benefits is a key factor in calculating lifetime monthly 
benefits.  If a worker retires at the earliest possible age of sixty-two, 
he receives reduced benefits; if he waits to retire beyond his full 
retirement age and works until seventy, he receives an increase in 
benefits beyond the normal level.88  Although simple in concept, 
there are a number of age-related factors that go into the calculation, 
and different standards are applied for different cohorts. 
This Part briefly reviews the policy origins of the retirement age in 
the original Social Security Act and then tracks important changes 
that have been made to the present.  The purpose is not only to 
describe the details of the interplay of the various age-related factors 
that determine benefits but also to discern the policy intentions behind 
those factors in order to give a context for the discussion of the 
current policy debate over retirement age. 
 
84 See Calmes, supra note 15. 
85 See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
86 Two prominent policy analysts, Professor Kathryn Moore and Nancy Altman, agree 
on two reform options but differ on the retirement age.  In prior articles, both have 
advocated increasing the payroll tax cap to include 87% or 90% of taxable payroll and 
redirecting the estate tax to fund Social Security.  Moore favors an increase in the 
retirement age.  Moore, supra note 14, at 1088–89.  Altman is adamantly against cutting 
benefits and would rather diversify the trust fund.  Social Security at 75 Years: More 
Necessary Now Than Ever: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Soc. Sec. of the H. Comm. 
on Ways & Means, 111th Cong. (2010) [hereinafter Social Security at 75 Years Hearings] 
(statement of Nancy J. Altman, Co-Director, Social Security Works). 
87 Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, § 202(a), 49 Stat. 620, 623 (1935). 
88 See infra Part II.B (providing details on benefits calculations). 
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A.  Historical Perspective: The 1935 Social Security Act 
The retirement age provisions in the Social Security Act have 
evolved considerably since 1935.89  The original retirement age of 
sixty-five was chosen more as a matter of compromise and consensus 
than for any “scientific or gerontological” reason.90  During the 
decision process, some policy makers called for a retirement age of 
sixty; however, those proposals did not merit serious consideration 
because of the cost.91  While seventy was the prevailing age for 
private pensions at the time, it was rejected as too high because life 
expectancies at birth in 1935 were only sixty-three years for women 
and fifty-nine years for men.92  Sixty-five became politically 
acceptable as a retirement age in part because it was thought that 
factions would oppose any higher age, given widespread 
unemployment at the time.93 
Congress first changed the retirement age in the Social Security 
Amendments of 1956, extending full benefits at age sixty-two to 
dependent mothers of deceased workers.94  The amendments also 
established the early eligibility age (EEA) of sixty-two for working 
women but at an actuarially reduced percentage.95  Full benefits could 
still be had if working women waited until age sixty-five, which was 
deemed the normal retirement age (NRA).96  Normal retirement age is 
now generally referred to as the full retirement age (FRA), though 
some references in the literature still refer to the “NRA.”97  Congress 
extended benefits at sixty-two to women before it did so for men for 
three reasons: (1) women generally faced age discrimination in the 
workforce more often than did men, (2) women who became widows 
before sixty-five and who had never worked before often had 
difficulty finding employment, and (3) the change allowed many 
 
89 See generally Moore, supra note 18 (detailing the political debate over the choice of 
sixty-five as the original age to receive benefits and the legislative history behind the 
subsequent revisions). 
90 Id. at 559. 
91 Id. at 547–48. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 548. 
94 Id. at 550–51. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 549–51. 
97 See U.S. SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, supra note 17, at 75. 
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married couples to retire at the same age because wives often were 
younger than their husbands.98 
The Social Security Amendments of 1961 expanded the EEA of 
sixty-two to include men, though eligibility and benefits were based 
on wages earned through age sixty-five so that there would be no 
additional cost.99  In the Social Security Amendments of 1972, 
Congress allowed eligibility and benefits for men to be based on 
earnings at age sixty-two in order to achieve parity between women 
and men in terms of Social Security benefits.100  Proposals to increase 
the normal retirement age from sixty-five were considered in 1975,101 
and changes were ultimately made in the 1983 Amendments in order 
to improve the solvency of the system.102 
B.  Current Law: Calculating Benefits 
The 1983 Amendments form the core structure of retirement age 
provisions as currently implemented, though Congress has made 
some adjustments since 1983.103  This Part reviews the age-related 
factors used to determine benefits. 
The terms “retirement age” and “retirement” can be misleading 
when discussing Social Security benefits.  Retirement is commonly 
understood to occur when a worker ceases employment and starts to 
receive benefits under Social Security.  In some of the Social Security 
literature, retirement equates with the start of receiving Social 
Security benefits regardless of whether one is still working.  
However, workers can simultaneously receive benefits and work and 
therefore be classified as working beneficiaries because they are 
paying into the system through the payroll tax.  In this Article, 
“retirement” equates with receiving benefits and ceasing work—i.e., a 
nonworking beneficiary. 
Calculating benefits under the current law is a three-step process.  
First, the SSA computes a worker’s average indexed monthly 
earnings (AIME), which is calculated from a worker’s highest thirty-
 
98 Moore, supra note 18, at 549–50. 
99 Id. at 552–53. 
100 Id. at 553–54. 
101 Id. at 554 (stating that the 1975 Advisory Council on Social Security took up the 
issue and made recommendations to increase the retirement age gradually starting in 
2005). 
102 Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65. 
103 See infra notes 125–26 and accompanying text. 
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five years’ worth of wages, as adjusted for wage inflation.104  Second, 
the AIME is used to calculate the primary insurance amount (PIA), 
which is the monthly benefit amount if someone retires at the full 
retirement age.105  Third, the PIA is adjusted downward if the person 
claims benefits early (before his FRA) or upward if the person claims 
benefits late (after his FRA).106  The age adjustment in benefits relies 
on four interrelated factors: the full retirement age, the early 
eligibility age, the delayed retirement credit, and the retirement 
earnings test. 
1.  Full Retirement Age (FRA) 
Workers who start claiming benefits at their FRA receive 100% of 
their PIA.  However, not all cohorts have the same FRA.  The FRA 
for an individual differs according to the year in which that individual 
was born.  The FRA for people born in 1937 or earlier is sixty-five.107  
One key provision of the 1983 Amendments was to gradually increase 
the FRA from sixty-five to sixty-seven for cohorts born later than 
1937.108  For people born after 1937, the FRA increases an additional 
two months for each birth year after 1937 until it reaches sixty-six for 
those born in 1943.109  For those born between 1943 and 1954, the 
FRA was stabilized at sixty-six.110  For those born in 1955 to 1960, 
the FRA again gradually increases two months for every year until it 
stabilizes at sixty-seven years old for those born in 1960 and later.111  
The purpose of the gradual increase was to allow for planning and to 
reduce the shock of a sudden increase in the retirement age for those 
close to the retirement age. 
 
104 SOC. SEC. ADMIN., SSA PUB. NO. 05-10070, YOUR RETIREMENT BENEFIT: HOW IS 
IT FIGURED? (2010), available at http://ssa.gov/pubs/10070.pdf. 
105 Id.  The PIA is a progressive benefit formula, such that “the ratio of benefits to 
average earnings is higher for those with low average earnings than for those with high 
average earnings.”  Moore, supra note 79, at 349.  For a more thorough discussion of how 
the PIA is calculated, see id. at 349–50. 
106 SOC. SEC. ADMIN., supra note 104.  Other adjustments occur if a beneficiary is a 
government worker with a pension.  Id. 
107 Retirement Planner: Full Retirement Age, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/retire2/retirechart.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2011). 
108 See id. 
109 See id. 
110 See id. 
111 See id. 
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2.  Early Eligibility Age (EEA) 
Rather than wait until their FRA, workers can elect to start 
receiving benefits at the early eligibility age (EEA) of sixty-two, 
though their benefits are reduced to a fraction of their PIA.  For every 
month before their FRA, benefits are reduced at five-ninths of 1% for 
the first thirty-six months (which is about 6.7% per year) before the 
FRA and five-twelfths of 1% for any additional month (which is an 
additional 5% per year).112  For a worker with an FRA of sixty-six, 
electing early retirement at sixty-two would reduce that person’s 
benefits by 25%—a deduction that would apply for the rest of that 
person’s life.113 
If the FRA were raised to sixty-eight, workers subject to the new 
age who claim at sixty-two would have benefits reduced by 35%—
20% for the first three years and 15% for the second three years.  If 
the FRA is raised to seventy, workers subject to that new retirement 
age who elect to receive benefits at sixty-two would be subject to a 
reduction of 45%—20% for the first three years and 25% for the 
additional five years.  Given that raising the FRA results in large 
reductions in benefits for early claimers, some proposals to increase 
the retirement age include proposals to increase the EEA as well.114 
3.  Delayed Retirement Credit (DRC) 
In addition to increasing the FRA, the delayed retirement credit 
(DRC) offers increased benefits as incentive for workers to delay 
retirement past their FRA.  The benefit increase is two-thirds of 1% 
per month delayed, which is an 8% increase per year that retirement is 
delayed past the FRA.115  The benefit increase stops at the age of 
seventy regardless of whether that person takes benefits or stays in the 
workforce.116  A worker with an FRA of sixty-seven who chooses to 
keep working until he is seventy would raise his benefits by 24%.  For 
workers who planned for a delayed retirement at seventy, an increase 
 
112 See Social Security Benefits: Benefit Reduction for Early Retirement, SOC. SEC. 
ADMIN., http://www.socialsecurity.gov/OACT/quickcalc/earlyretire.html (last visited Mar. 
29, 2011). 
113 Retirement Planner: Retirement Benefits by Year of Birth, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/retire2/agereduction.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2011). 
114 See infra Part IV.C. 
115 Retirement Planner: Delayed Retirement Credits, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., http://www 
.socialsecurity.gov/retire2/delayret.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2011).  This is the rate that 
applies to those born in 1943 and later.  Id. 
116 Id. 
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in the FRA from sixty-seven to sixty-eight would deny them an 8% 
increase in benefits.117 
4.  Retirement Earnings Test (RET) 
Finally, the retirement earnings test (RET) further reduces the 
benefit amount for some workers who choose to claim early but 
continue to work.118  This earnings test applies only to income earned 
by workers who claim benefits before they reach their FRA.  The 
allowable amount of income without a benefit reduction depends 
upon whether a worker reached his FRA in a given year. 
For example, a worker who had elected to receive benefits at sixty-
two could earn only up to $14,160 without a reduction in Social 
Security benefits.119  For such workers, benefits are reduced by $1 for 
every $2 in wages earned above the limit.120  However, in a year that 
a worker-beneficiary reaches his FRA, benefits are reduced by a 
lesser amount—$1 for every $3 in wages above $37,680 for those 
workers who reached their FRA in 2010.121  Any income earned after 
a worker reaches his FRA is not subject to the earnings test. 
To the extent that a worker has his benefits reduced by the earnings 
test, the calculation of his benefit rate is actuarially increased for 
benefits payments after he reaches his FRA.122  Despite this actuarial 
adjustment, the RET is perceived by many as a disincentive to stay in 
the labor force.123  Consequently, there have been efforts to reform 
and limit the RET.  Prior to 1983, the RET applied to any earnings 
after retirement up to age seventy-one, regardless of whether a 
beneficiary elected to start benefits at the EEA or his FRA; however, 
in 1983, the upper age limit was reduced to sixty-nine.124 
 
117 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 72, at 30 n.43. 
118 See Automatic Increases: Exempt Amounts Under the Earnings Test, SOC. SEC. 
ADMIN., http://www.socialsecurity.gov/OACT/COLA/rtea.html (last visited Feb. 20, 
2011). 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 BOARD OF TRUSTEES, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 108–10. 
122 Steven J. Haider & David S. Loughran, The Effect of the Social Security Earnings 
Test on Male Labor Supply: New Evidence from Survey and Administrative Data, 43 J. 
HUM. RESOURCES 57, 59, 61 (2008). 
123 Id. at 58. 
124 Automatic Increases: Exempt Amounts, 1975–1999, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., http://www 
.ssa.gov/oact/cola/rteahistory.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2011). 
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In 2000, the RET and earnings limits were removed for income 
received after a beneficiary reaches his FRA.125  The legislative 
purpose in removing the RET for post-FRA employment was an 
attempt to keep generating revenues for the trust fund—i.e., to 
encourage beneficiaries to continue to work so that those workers’ 
current payroll taxes would help fund current benefits.  In other 
words, the outflow in benefits would be partially replaced by the 
inflows from working beneficiaries.126 
The Commissioner of Social Security did not support elimination 
of the RET for lower ages in 2000 because it was thought that it 
would lead to a significantly higher percentage of the elderly in 
poverty.127  Working on the assumption that the repeal of the RET for 
lower ages would lead some workers to claim earlier than planned, 
researchers estimated that the lower benefits for those early claimers 
could have increased the poverty level from 12% to 13.9%, using data 
from 1993.128  Further discussion of eliminating the RET is 
considered in Parts VI.B and VIII.A of this Article. 
Given the interplay of these four age related factors—FRA, EEA, 
DRC, and RET—eligible workers have two key decisions that affect 
their Social Security benefits and income: (1) when to start claiming 
benefits and (2) whether to continue to work.  As an eligible worker 
turns sixty-two, there are essentially four categories of worker-
beneficiary status within the eligible age ranges: nonworking 
beneficiaries, working beneficiaries, working non-beneficiaries, and 
nonworking non-beneficiaries.  Each category carries importance in 
terms of crafting policy. 
5.  Actuarial Fairness and the Four Factors 
The adjustments in benefits were designed to be actuarially neutral 
in terms of when a beneficiary makes a claim.129  Actuarial neutrality 
 
125 Senior Citizens’ Freedom to Work Act of 2000, H.R. 5, 106th Cong. (2000). 
126 Bo MacInnis, Social Security and the Joint Trends in Labor Supply and Benefits 
Receipt Among Older Men 4 (Ctr. for Ret. Research at Bos. Coll., Working Paper No. 
2009-22, 2009), available at http://crr.bc.edu/images/stories/Working_Papers/wp_2009-22 
.pdf. 
127 Michael A. Anzick & David A. Weaver, The Impact of Repealing the Retirement 
Earnings Test on Rates of Poverty, 63 SOC. SEC. BULL., no. 2, 2000, at 3. 
128 Id. at 6–7. 
129 GAYLE L. REZNIK, DAVID A. WEAVER & ANDREW G. BIGGS, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 
ISSUE PAPER NO. 2009-02, SOCIAL SECURITY AND MARGINAL RETURNS TO WORK NEAR 
RETIREMENT 3 (2009).  In the literature, policy analysts use the terms “actuarial fairness” 
and “actuarial neutrality” as synonyms.  However, a technical distinction can be drawn 
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means that the present value of benefits received for claiming early 
will be roughly equal to the present value of benefits claimed after or 
at the FRA.130  Therefore, claimers should be indifferent as to when 
they claim benefits.131  On average, the deduction in benefits from 
claiming early and the increase in benefits for claiming later are 
meant to roughly balance one another so that workers receive the 
same amount of lifetime benefits regardless of the age at which they 
elect to receive benefits.  Actuarial neutrality is important to the 
system’s financing so that there is no additional cost associated with 
early or late benefits claiming.132 
Some controversy surrounds whether the system is truly actuarially 
neutral.133  While actuarial neutrality works on a macro level, there is 
strategic decision making at the individual and subpopulation levels 
because demographic groups have different longevity rates134 and 
individuals can often assess their own longevity.135  Not surprisingly, 
 
between the two terms.  See Monika Queisser & Edward Whitehouse, Neutral or Fair? 
Actuarial Concepts and Pension-System Design 4 (OECD Soc., Emp’t & Migration 
Working Papers, Paper No. 40, 2006), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/2/42 
/37811399.pdf.  I follow the example of Reznik, Weaver, and Biggs and use the terms 
interchangeably. 
130 Queisser & Whitehouse, supra note 129, at 4. 
131 Hugo Benítez-Silva & Na Yin, An Empirical Study of the Effects of Social Security 
Reforms on Benefit Claiming Behavior and Receipt Using Public-Use Administrative 
Microdata, 69 SOC. SEC. BULL., no. 3, 2009, at 77, 79. 
132 Id. 
133 See James E. Duggan & Christopher J. Soares, Actuarial Nonequivalence in Early 
and Delayed Social Security Benefit Claims, 30 PUB. FIN. REV. 188, 188–89 (2002).  
Although the authors use the term “actuarial equivalence,” its meaning is the same as how 
actuarial neutrality or actuarial fairness is described in much of the Social Security 
literature—i.e., that the present value of total benefits is equal regardless of when benefits 
are claimed.  Id. at 188. 
134 For an example of how financial advisors advise clients in strategic decision making, 
see William Meyer & William Reichenstein, Social Security: When to Start Benefits and 
How to Minimize Longevity Risk, J. FIN. PLAN., March 2010, at 49, 57–58. 
135 The SSA provides workers with information on average life expectancy for different 
demographics.  Additionally, a number of longevity calculators are available on the 
Internet that use health and survey data to give an estimate of an individual’s life 
expectancy based on his or her characteristics (e.g., gender, race), status (e.g., married, 
single), and behavior (e.g., smoking and drinking habits).  See Mark Stibich, Top 
Longevity Calculators and Longevity Tests—Review, ABOUT.COM, http://longevity.about 
.com/od/longevitytools/tp/top-longevity-calculators.htm (last updated June 24, 2008) 
(providing a review of longevity calculators). 
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people with health problems that may affect life expectancy have a 
higher probability of claiming benefits earlier.136 
Problems might arise if benefit adjustments are not actuarially 
neutral on a broad scale because they will alter claiming behavior in 
ways that policy makers did not expect—possibly affecting the cost of 
the program as well as resulting in unintended redistribution.137  
Actuarial neutrality comes into question when discussing the policy 
objective of encouraging workers to retire late.  One purpose behind 
the retirement age provisions of the 1983 Amendments was to 
encourage workers to stay in the labor force longer.138  The upside of 
encouraging later retirement includes greater inflows into the Social 
Security Trust Funds because workers contribute to the system 
through the payroll tax139 as well as increased income tax revenue for 
the general fund.140  Moreover, by continuing to work, individuals 
reduce the risk of outliving their resources (e.g., savings, IRAs, 
401(k)s, etc.) by maximizing their Social Security benefits.141 
To the extent that the 1983 Amendments have not achieved that 
goal—i.e., that there is a bias towards early claiming—policy makers 
should make adjustments.  Duggan and Soares found that the 
adjustments were not neutral when taking into account gender and 
lifetime earnings.142  They found that men as a group—particularly 
low income males—have incentives to claim early, and women have 
incentives to claim late.143  The implication from a policy point of 
view is that, when considering gender, the Social Security system is 
not actuarially neutral because there are “substantial lifetime actuarial 
premiums for males who claim early and actuarial losses for early 
claiming females.”144  Duggan and Soares also found that the 8%-per-
 
136 See Selahattin Imrohoroglu & Sagiri Kitao, Social Security, Benefit Claiming and 
Labor Force Participation: A Quantitative General Equilibrium Approach 1 (Ctr. for Ret. 
Research at Bos. Coll., Working Paper No. 2010-2, 2010). 
137 Duggan & Soares, supra note 133, at 188–89. 
138 Moore, supra note 18, at 568. 
139 Giovanni Mastrobuoni, Labor Supply Effects of the Recent Social Security Benefit 
Cuts: Empirical Estimates Using Cohort Discontinuities, 93 J. PUB. ECON. 1224, 1224 
(2009) (noting that continued labor force participation results in greater revenues); see also 
Moore, supra note 18, at 567. 
140 See infra note 240 and accompanying text (discussing the increase of income tax 
revenues). 
141 Meyer & Reichenstein, supra note 134, at 57–58. 
142 Duggan & Soares, supra note 133, at 188–89. 
143 Id. at 198–99. 
144 Id. at 205. 
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year benefit adjustment provided by the DRC was not enough to 
result in actuarial neutrality.145  These results suggest that further 
adjustments need to be made to the DRC in order to encourage labor 
force participation among the elderly.  Other studies show similar 
findings.  Queisser and Whitehouse found that the reduction in 
benefits for early claiming was too low to be actuarially fair, thereby 
creating incentives to retire early and a penalty for retiring late.146 
III 
ARGUMENTS AND VALUES DRIVING REFORM 
While some Democratic and Republican leaders seem to favor an 
increase in the retirement age, the policy initiative can have harsh 
consequences for those unable to work later into life.147  This Part 
outlines the arguments for and against an increase and then discusses 
what values should guide reform. 
A.  Policy Debate: Pros and Cons 
Proponents of increasing the retirement age make the following 
arguments to justify the reform: 
1. Longer life expectancies are putting a burden on the financing 
system because benefits are being paid out for a longer period 
than in the past.  Increasing the retirement age will reduce the 
aggregate amount of benefits paid out, thus easing the stress in 
the system.148 
2. Increasing the retirement age will encourage people to stay in 
the workforce longer,149 and this will result in greater net 
inflows through payroll taxes, thereby also improving 
solvency.150 
 
145 Id. at 189. 
146 Benítez-Silva & Yin, supra note 131, at 92 n.15; Queisser & Whitehouse, supra note 
129. 
147 MELISSA M. FAVREAULT & RICHARD W. JOHNSON, URB. INST., RAISING SOCIAL 
SECURITY’S RETIREMENT AGE  (2010), available at http://www.urban.org/uploadedPDF 
/412167-Raising-Social-Security.pdf (noting that raising the retirement age “appears to be 
gaining political traction”). 
148 Tom Terry, Raising the Retirement Age Will Help Save Social Security, U.S. NEWS 
& WORLD REP., Sept. 20, 2010, http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2010/09/20 
/raising-the-retirement-age-will-help-save-social-security. 
149 U.S. SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, supra note 17, at 52. 
150 See infra Part IV.A–C. 
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3. Working longer will improve the retirement savings of 
individuals, reducing the possibility of exhausting their 
resources in old age.151 
4. Health is better among the elderly than in previous 
generations, thereby allowing a longer work life.152 
5. A decrease in physically demanding jobs also allows people to 
work longer. 153 
6. Education levels have improved, and a correlation exists 
between higher education and the ability to work longer.154 
7. Elderly Americans are underutilized, and a higher “retirement 
age would make better use of the skills and abilities of . . . 
older workers.”155 
8. The elderly stand to gain in noneconomic ways because 
employment “may contribute to an older person’s mental 
acuity and provide a sense of usefulness.”156 
9. The demand for skilled older workers will remain high given 
that there are fewer younger workers to replace them.157 
10. Increasing the number of people in the labor force will also 
increase gross domestic product, thereby “creating more 
resources that could be split between workers and retirees.”158 
In addition to disputing many of these contentions and the 
assumptions upon which they are made, the opponents’ principal 
arguments are: 
1. The reduced benefits will increase the poverty rate because 
many of those at risk—the poor, the less educated, those with 
 
151 FAVREAULT & JOHNSON, supra note 147. 
152 HYE JIN RHO, CTR. FOR ECON. & POL’Y RES., HARD WORK? PATTERNS IN 
PHYSICALLY DEMANDING LABOR AMONG OLDER WORKERS 2 (2010), available at http:// 
www.cepr.net /documents/publications/older-workers-2010-08.pdf. 
153 Terry, supra note 148. 
154 FAVREAULT & JOHNSON, supra note 147. 
155 AARP PUB. POLICY INST., INSIGHT ON THE ISSUES: REFORM OPTIONS FOR SOCIAL 
SECURITY 1, 4 (2008). 
156 JOANNA N. LAHEY, CTR. FOR RET. RESEARCH AT BOS. COLL., DO OLDER 
WORKERS FACE DISCRIMINATION? 1 (2005), available at http://crr.bc.edu/images/stories 
/Briefs/ib_33.pdf. 
157 Terry, supra note 148. 
158 FAVREAULT & JOHNSON, supra note 147, at 2. 
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health problems, and those who work in physically demanding 
jobs—have no choice but to retire early.159 
2. Not all groups have seen the same increase in life expectancy, 
so those with historically shorter life expectancies—African 
Americans, the poor, the less educated, and blue collar 
workers—are affected disproportionally by an increase in the 
retirement age because they stand to reap fewer benefits.160 
3. Older workers have more difficulty finding new employment 
and, when they do, often earn less than they did in previous 
jobs.161 
Given these two positions, a number of questions arise: To what 
extent will the Social Security financing deficit be improved by 
increasing the retirement age?  Will an increase in the FRA actually 
compel people to work longer, or will they just take the reduction in 
benefits?  Has the increase in life expectancy also resulted in an 
increase in work capacity?  To what extent are certain subpopulations 
unfairly disadvantaged through lower benefits?  Can the imbalance 
created by an increase in the retirement age be offset through other 
means, such as increased access to disability programs or the 
establishment of a minimum benefit? 
The analysis that follows is centered on two interrelated themes—
(1) economic consequences of an increase in the retirement age and 
(2) employment issues.  In analyzing economic consequences, I 
address both the macro and micro levels by looking at the effect of 
raising the age on Social Security’s long-term deficit and how raising 
the retirement age will affect workers’ finances during retirement.  
Employment issues cover a spectrum of topics, including whether 
raising the retirement age will achieve the policy goal of encouraging 
workers to retire later and whether workers have the capacity and the 
ability to retire later in life. 
Any proposal for reform should also consider the purpose, 
principles, and value system inherent within the Social Security Act.  
 
159 RHO, supra note 152, at 2; see also Ross Eisenbrey, Cutting Benefits Isn’t the Way 
to Save Social Security, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 20, 2010, http://www.usnews 
.com/opinion/articles/2010/09/20/cutting-benefits-isnt-the-way-to-save-social-security. 
160 Social Security at 75 Years Hearings, supra note 86, at 8–9 (statement of Nancy J. 
Altman, Co-Director, Social Security Works). 
161 See infra Part VII.C–D. 
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It is not necessarily the case that the option that provides the best 
financing solution is consistent with the values of Social Security.162 
B.  Social Security’s Value System 
In a recent article, Professor Kathryn Moore analyzed Social 
Security’s value system in order to distill a general set of principles 
that should guide any reform.163  Additionally, I discuss values and 
norms that help inform policy-making decisions as to retirement age 
issues specifically. 
Although the Social Security Act does not lay out a value system, 
there is wide agreement that it currently embodies nine principles set 
forth by former Social Security Commissioner Robert Ball.164  These 
principles are (1) Universal, or Nearly Universal, Coverage,165 (2) 
Earned Right,166 (3) Wage Related,167 (4) Contributory and Self-
Financed,168 (5) Redistributive,169 (6) Not Means Tested,170 (7) Wage 
 
162 Not everyone agrees with this statement.  President Bush presented his 2001 
Commission to Strengthen Social Security with a different set of principles that would 
have partially transformed Social Security to a system of private accounts.  Moore, supra 
note 14, at 1072. 
163 See id. 
164 Id. at 1064.  Next to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Robert Ball, the Social 
Security Commissioner under Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon, is considered one 
of the staunchest supporters of the present social insurance system.  Id. 
165 Id. at 1065 (stating that Social Security covers 96% of American workers). 
166 Id. at 1066. 
167 Id. at 1066–67 (stating that benefits are tied to long time earnings and that higher 
wage earners will have a larger monthly check than lower wage earners, which helps 
mitigate the redistributive effects of Social Security). 
168 By designating the payroll tax as a funding mechanism in the original Social 
Security Act, President Roosevelt sought to protect the system from political maneuvering 
by giving taxpayers the “‘legal, moral, and political right to collect their pensions and their 
unemployment benefits.’” Id. at 1067 (quoting ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE 
COMING OF THE NEW DEAL 308–09 (1958)).  This principle also self-regulates excessive 
growth in the benefits calculation because employers and workers would have to increase 
their taxes in the event of a jump in benefits.  Id. at 1067–68. 
169 The benefits calculation for Social Security redistributes wealth from higher wage 
earners to lower wage earners, as well as between generations.  While nearly all workers 
contribute—whether rich or poor—the lower wage earners receive a higher replacement 
rate (i.e., the amount of earnings that are replaced through Social Security’s monthly 
check) than higher wage earners.  Id. at 1068. 
170 Id. at 1069.  Means testing is a welfare-related concept where benefits are awarded 
to those deemed in need, whereas those with the means to survive are denied benefits. 
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Indexed,171 (8) Inflation Protected,172 and (9) Compulsory.173  
Tension exists among the nine principles as the system attempts to 
balance social adequacy with individual equity.174  For example, the 
principle of redistribution of wealth to the poor contradicts the wage-
related principle because higher wage earners reap higher benefits.175  
Some consider the balance between these opposing goals the inherent 
strength of a collectivist program, while others point to the 
contradicting principles as an indication of flaws within the 
structure.176 
While the Social Security system can be characterized as 
embodying these principles, “there is no[] universal agreement on the 
principles that should guide reform.”177  President George W. Bush 
articulated a set of principles that would have fundamentally changed 
the structure of Social Security from a defined benefit plan to a 
defined contribution plan,178 which would have fundamentally altered 
the collectivist nature of the system.179 
Professor Moore suggests that any reform “retain Social Security’s 
fundamental structure but gradually introduce changes on both the 
revenue and benefit side so as to distribute the burden of reform 
widely across generations and within generations.”180  Toward this 
end, Moore advocates a set of reform principles that include (1) 
retaining the collectivist approach of Social Security;181 (2) fixing the 
 
171 Id. at 1070 (stating that a wage-indexed system provides that, as the national average 
wage for a cohort fluctuates, benefits are adjusted through indexing in order to reflect the 
living standard for a particular generation of workers). 
172 Id. (stating that cost-of-living adjustments are made automatically in order to adjust 
to rising prices). 
173 Id. at 1071 (stating that everyone contributes, which results in a more collectivist 
responsibility for old age rather than individual responsibility). 
174 Id. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. at 1072. 
178 See PRESIDENT’S COMM’N TO STRENGTHEN SOC. SEC., STRENGTHENING SOCIAL 
SECURITY AND CREATING PERSONAL WEALTH FOR ALL AMERICANS 38 (2001), available 
at http://www.ssa.gov/history/reports/pcsss/Final_report.pdf. 
179 Moore, supra note 14, at 1073–75. 
180 Id. at 1088. 
181 The collectivist approach contrasts with that of individual responsibility.  
Collectivism pools together risks, whereas individualism maintains decision making over 
one’s resources with the individual taxpayer, rather than the government.  See id. at 1073–
75. 
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long-term deficit;182 (3) increasing revenue, reducing benefits, or 
both;183 (4) implementing sooner than later;184 (5) sharing burdens 
widely;185 (6) retaining Social Security’s safety net;186 and (7) 
ensuring that reform encompasses true bipartisan effort.187  Moore 
suggests that a gradual increase in the normal retirement age would be 
consistent with these principles because it helps achieve the goals of 
solvency by spreading the burden of the benefit across many 
cohorts.188 
Finally, an additional value system that should be discussed that is 
specific to retirement age proposals is the evolving norms 
surrounding the age at which people should retire—i.e., the usual 
retirement age.189  Within U.S. laws and regulations, there is no 
universal norm as to a retirement age.  Tax laws provide for penalty 
free withdrawals at age fifty-nine and six months from 401(k) 
plans190 and individual retirement accounts (IRAs),191 while the 
earliest age for Social Security benefits is sixty-two.  Although formal 
laws might not peg a specific age at which people can start to retire, 
informal social norms and mores are extraordinarily important in 
influencing formal rules.192  There may be “noneconomic channels, 
such as changes in social norms or the ‘focal’ retirement age” that 
 
182 See id. at 1075–78. 
183 Moore rejects structural changes, such as the individual accounts proposals, and 
advocates some set of reforms that would gradually increase taxes, reduce benefits, or a 
combination of the two.  See id. at 1078–82. 
184 See id. at 1082–84. 
185 See id. at 1084–85. 
186 See id. at 1085–86. 
187 See id. at 1087–88. 
188 Id. at 1088–89.  Increasing the normal retirement age is only one of three proposed 
reforms that Moore discusses.  She also advocates increasing the taxable wage base and 
using the estate tax to fund Social Security as two other reforms that are consistent with 
the principles she sets out.  Id. 
189 Charles Brown, The Role of Conventional Retirement Age in Retirement Decisions 8 
(Univ. of Mich. Ret. Research Ctr., Working Paper No. 2006-120, 2006). 
190 Topic 424—401(k) Plans, IRS.GOV, http://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc424.html (last 
updated Mar. 1, 2011). 
191 Topic 451—Individual Retirement Arrangements (IRAs), IRS.GOV, http://www.irs 
.gov/taxtopics/tc451.html (last updated Mar. 1, 2011). 
192 The literature surrounding the study of institutional change discusses the importance 
of informal customs on the development of formal rules and laws.  See PETER A. HALL & 
DAVID SOSKICE, VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 1–8 (Oxford Univ. Press 2001) (describing the importance of 
institutions—both formal and informal—as rules of the game governing an economy). 
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also affect the decision on when to retire.193  To the extent that 
workers perceive there is a usual retirement age for their job, they 
tend to retire at that age.194  If there is no perceived usual retirement 
age, workers tend to retire early.195  Additionally, there is a growing 
trend that people prefer working to retirement.196  According to one 
survey, the age at which workers expect to retire has increased.  In 
1991, 50% of workers expected to retire before sixty-five, but only 
28% expect to do so as of 2010.197 
The trend in other Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) countries can help inform the social norm in 
the United States.  In the last four years, many countries have 
increased their retirement age or have proposals to do so.  Australia, 
Denmark, France, and Germany have passed measures to increase 
their normal retirement age from sixty-five to sixty-seven, and the 
United Kingdom increased its age from sixty-five to sixty-eight.198  
Proposals exist to make similar reforms in Ireland, Spain, and the 
Netherlands.199  Notably, most of the countries increased their 
retirement age to align with the current target of sixty-seven in the 
United States rather than moving to the more aggressive seventy-
year-old standard.  While international standards provide a 
comparative context, it should be noted that each of these countries 
has different traditions as to retirement as well as differences in 
longevity, health, and employment. 
 
193 David M. Blau & Ryan M. Goodstein, Can Social Security Explain Trends in Labor 
Force Participation of Older Men in the United States?, 45 J. HUM. RESOURCES 328, 354 
(2010). 
194 Brown, supra note 189, at 11. 
195 Id. at 12. 
196 Xiaoyan Li, Extending the Working Lives of Older Workers: The Impact of Social 
Security Policies and Labor Market 56–57 (June 2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Pardee RAND Graduate School), available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs 
/rgs_dissertations/2010/RAND_RGSD265.pdf. 
197 EMP’T BENEFIT RESEARCH INST. & MATHEW GREENWALD & ASSOCS., 
RETIREMENT CONFIDENCE SURV., 2010 RCS FACT SHEET #2: CHANGING EXPECTATIONS 
ABOUT RETIREMENT 1 (2010), available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/surveys/rcs/2010/FS  
-02_RCS-10_Expectns.pdf. 
198 MARTIN HERING & THOMAS R. KLASSEN, IS 70 THE NEW 65? RAISING THE 
ELIGIBILITY AGE IN THE CANADA PENSION PLAN 14 (2010), available at 
http://www.mowatcentre.ca/pdfs/mowatResearch/28.pdf. 
199 Id. 
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IV 
REDUCTION OF THE LONG-TERM SOCIAL SECURITY DEFICIT 
Not all proposals to increase the retirement age result in the same 
level of savings.  The SSA’s Office of the Actuary lists eleven 
different plans that would adjust benefits by making changes 
involving the FRA, the EEA, or both.200  Each plan affects birth-year 
cohorts differently and results in different levels of reduction for the 
long-term deficit.201  While it is not the purpose of this Article to 
provide a catalog of the various initiatives and studies, I will compare 
three proposals to increase the FRA as well as issues surrounding 
increasing the EEA and other factors.  First, however, I will discuss 
the methods by which the SSA measures solvency in order to give a 
basis for understanding the impact of any given reform proposal. 
A.  Measuring Solvency: The Actuarial Balance and Unfunded 
Obligations 
Actuaries at the SSA gauge the solvency of the system using a 
variety of methods that measure the deficit over a seventy-five-year 
period.202  One metric to gauge solvency is the actuarial balance, 
which is “the difference between income and cost of the program 
expressed as a percentage of taxable payroll over the [next seventy-
five years].”203  In the 2010 annual report, the SSA reported a 
negative actuarial balance of 1.92% of taxable payroll.204  Thus, 
increasing the payroll tax by slightly more than 1.92%—i.e., from the 
current level of 12.4% (combining both employers’ and employees’ 
contributions) to 14.38%—would eliminate the shortfall.205  
 
200 Eight of the plans affect the FRA, and three plans modify rules that affect either the 
EEA or both the FRA and EEA.  See Actuarial Publications: Provisions Affecting 
Retirement Age, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., http://www.socialsecurity.gov/OACT/solvency 
/provisions/retireage.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2011) [hereinafter Provisions Affecting 
Retirement Age]. 
201 See id. 
202 BOARD OF TRUSTEES, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 35. 
203 Id. at 11. 
204 Id. at 11–12 (calculating actuarial balance using the intermediate assumptions). 
205 Id. at 61.  The SSA predicts the payroll would need to be raised slightly higher that 
the 1.92% shortfall in order to achieve solvency because it is assumed that some 
employers and employees would quit because of the higher taxes, thus shrinking the tax 
base.  Id. 
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Alternatively, an immediate reduction in benefits by 12.8% would 
eliminate the seventy-five-year deficit without increasing taxes.206 
Another method used to estimate the deficit is to measure the 
cumulative unfunded obligation.  This is derived by calculating the 
present value of the cumulative value of income, minus cost for each 
of the next seventy-five years.207  In any given year, a positive 
balance indicates that there are reserves in the trust funds to pay 
benefits, and a negative balance shows the point at which trust fund 
reserves are exhausted.208  This cumulative unfunded obligation is 
sometimes also compared as a percentage of future gross domestic 
product (GDP).209  For 2010, the SSA estimated that the present value 
of the shortfall was $5.4 trillion for the period through 2084, which 
represents 0.6% of the future GDP for the period.210 
The SSA is continually revising its projections and readily admits 
the uncertainty of its assumptions.211  The SSA actuaries make 
predictions using low, high, and intermediate cost assumptions.  
Following the example of most commentators, I rely on the 
intermediate figures in this Article. 
B.  Proposals to Increase the FRA 
For the purpose of illustrating the way in which the deficit 
reduction might be affected, I will analyze three different proposals.  
One proposal gradually increases the retirement age, while the second 
increases the age at a more rapid rate.  The third proposal indexes the 
age to increases in longevity.  These comparisons illustrate how the 
timing and method of increasing the retirement age affects the degree 
of savings and the impact on different cohorts. 
For the first two proposals, the first step is to “[s]horten the hiatus 
in the normal retirement age (start increasing to age 67 for those age 
62 in 2010, rather than those age 62 in 2017).” 212  Under the gradual-
 
206 Id.  If projections go beyond the seventy-five-year horizon, the SSA predicts a 
shortfall of “3.3 percent of taxable payroll under the intermediate assumptions,” thereby 
requiring an immediate tax increase to 15.9% or an immediate reduction of 20.7% in 
benefits to achieve solvency.  Id. 
207 Id. at 12. 
208 Id. 
209 Id. at 13. 
210 Id. at 12. 
211 Id. at 15. 
212 See Actuarial Publications: Summary of Provisions That Would Change the Social 
Security Program, supra note 76 (discussing Proposals C1.2 and C1.4).  I use the label 
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increase proposal, the FRA for later cohorts continues to increase by a 
factor of one month for every two years until the full retirement age 
rises to a new high of age sixty-eight.213  Although some retirees 
expecting an FRA of sixty-six would now have a higher age, the 
subsequent increase for other cohorts is eased in slowly.214  The 
gradual-increase approach would improve the shortfall by 0.46% of 
the present value of taxable payroll over seventy-five years and would 
reduce the long-range actuarial deficit by 22.5%.215 
In comparison, the rapid increase proposal would improve the 
shortfall by 0.57% of payroll and reduce the long-term deficit by 
28.5%. 216  The improved savings come at the expense of a gradual 
increase.  Under this plan, however, the FRA would increase at a pace 
of two months for every year, thereby phasing in the increase much 
more rapidly than under the first plan.217  Of course, if the FRA is 
increased to seventy rather than sixty-eight, even greater savings 
would result.  Under the first plan discussed, if the increase continues 
to seventy rather than sixty-eight, then 0.62% of taxable payroll is 
saved, and the long-range deficit is reduced by 31%.218 
 
“gradual increase” to describe Proposal C1.2 and “rapid increase” to describe Proposal 
C1.4. 
213 Id. (discussing Proposal C1.2). 
214 See id.  The rate of increase of one month for every two birth years is more gradual 
than currently scheduled increases in the FRA.  Under the current Social Security Act, the 
rate of increase—for those cohorts experiencing an increase—is a two month increase in 
the FRA for every one birth year.  See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
215 See Detailed Single Year Tables, Category of Change: Retirement Age, SOC. SEC. 
ADMIN., https://docs.google.com/viewer?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ssa.gov%2FOACT 
%2Fsolvency%2Fprovisions%2Ftables%2Ftable_run305.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2011) 
(discussing Proposal C1.2).  These percentage improvements were based upon the 2009 
projected actuarial balance deficit of 2% of taxable payroll.  Id.  Proposal C1.2 would 
decrease the long-range actuarial balance from -2% to -1.55%, which is a 22.5% 
improvement.  Id.  Other projections reported in this Article are assumed to use the more 
current deficit figures reported in 2010 by the Social Security Administration. 
216 See Detailed Single Year Tables, Category of Change: Retirement Age, SOC. SEC. 
ADMIN., https://docs.google.com/viewer?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ssa.gov%2FOACT 
%2Fsolvency%2Fprovisions%2Ftables%2Ftable_run312.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2011) 
(discussing Proposal C1.4).  Proposal C1.4 would decrease the long-range actuarial 
balance from -2% to -1.43%, which is a 28.5% improvement.  See id. 
217 Actuarial Publications: Summary of Provisions That Would Change the Social 
Security Program, supra note 76 (discussing Proposal C1.4). 
218 See id. (discussing Proposal C1.3).  Proposal C1.3 would decrease the long-range 
actuarial balance from -2% to -1.39%, which is a 31% improvement.  See Detailed Single 
Year Tables, Category of Change: Retirement Age, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., https://docs.google 
.com/viewer?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ssa.gov%2FOACT%2Fsolvency%2Fprovisions
%2Ftables%2Ftable_run306.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2011) (discussing Proposal C1.3). 
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Another innovative approach to solving the problem of increasing 
life expectancies would be to index increases in the retirement age to 
increases in longevity.  In this way, the retirement age would 
automatically adjust upwards as life expectancies increase without the 
need to pass additional legislation.  Such an approach to maintain 
solvency provides more certainty to the system and avoids “large 
program changes made in crisis mode.”219  Twelve other countries 
have adopted some form of life expectancy indexing for their public 
pension programs.220 
Indexing proposals have been considered by both congressional 
committees and the Social Security Administration221 and have 
formed the basis of the retirement age increase in the Fiscal 
Commission’s December 2010 report.222  One plan examined by the 
Senate mandates a gradual increase in the retirement age that 
“roughly matches assumptions about increasing life expectancy.”223  
The FRA would be increased by one month for every two birth years, 
starting with workers born after 1960.  Under this schedule, the FRA 
would reach sixty-eight for workers born in 1984, gradually increase 
to sixty-nine for those born in 2008, and ultimately reach seventy for 
people born in 2032.224  The indexing approach is presumably fairer 
to individual cohorts because it tries to match increases in longevity 
to benefits.  Although fairer, this approach results in a smaller 
reduction of the deficit.  Under this plan, the long-term shortfall 
would be reduced by 0.40% of taxable payroll, resulting in 
approximately an 18% reduction of the shortfall.225 
The Fiscal Commission’s December 2010 recommendation to 
increase the retirement age is similar to the Senate report, though it 
proposes increases in both the FRA and EEA that would be indexed 
to longevity.  Under the Fiscal Commission’s plan, the retirement age 
would gradually rise from the current cap of sixty-seven to an 
estimated sixty-nine by increasing at a rate of one month for every 
 
219 AARP PUB. POLICY INST., IN BRIEF: SOCIAL SECURITY FINANCING: AUTOMATIC 
ADJUSTMENTS TO RESTORE SOLVENCY 1 (2009), available at http://assets.aarp.org 
/rgcenter/econ/inb166_socsec.pdf. 
220 Id. at 1–2. 
221 U.S. SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, supra note 17, at 53; see also Provisions 
Affecting Retirement Age, supra note 200. 
222 See FISCAL COMM’N, THE MOMENT OF TRUTH, supra note 2, at 50. 
223 U.S. SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, supra note 17, at 53. 
224 Id. 
225 Id. 
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two birth years.226  The EEA would increase at the same rate in order 
to “maintain a constant ratio of years in retirement to years in 
adulthood.”227  The Fiscal Commission anticipates that its 
recommendations for raising the retirement age would improve the 
Social Security funding deficit by 18%.228 
C.  Proposals to Increase the EEA 
Some analysts believe that the current EEA provides incentives to 
workers to retire early, and they suggest that raising the EEA would 
keep more workers in the labor force.229  To the extent that workers 
remain in the labor force longer, the result is better retirement 
income.230  Raising the EEA would mean that the earliest claimers 
would have less of a reduction in their monthly benefit given that the 
number of months between the EEA and FRA would be reduced.  
This might have a positive effect on keeping the elderly poor out of 
poverty by requiring labor force participation at a later age, assuming, 
of course, that they have the capacity and ability to find work.231 
Opponents to an increase in the EEA cite many of the same reasons 
as those used in arguing against an increase in the FRA—i.e., 
unfairness to at-risk groups and a disproportionate effect on groups 
with shorter life expectancies.232  A hike in the EEA would result in 
hardship for those at risk of poverty because of poor health, a lack of 
assets, and poor prospects for employment because they might not be 
able to provide for themselves between the ages of sixty-two and 
sixty-four.233  For groups with lower life expectancies, such as 
African Americans and low wage earners, an increase in the EEA 
 
226 FISCAL COMM’N, THE MOMENT OF TRUTH, supra note 2, at 50. 
227 Id. 
228 Id. at 54.  The Fiscal Commission also proposed other reform measures that would 
eliminate the financing deficit.  See supra notes 82–83 and accompanying text. 
229 JOHN A. TURNER, CTR. FOR RET. RESEARCH AT BOS. COLL., PROMOTING WORK: 
IMPLICATIONS OF RAISING SOCIAL SECURITY’S EARLY RETIREMENT AGE 1 (2007); see 
also Hugo Benítez-Silva & Frank Heiland, Early Retirement, Labor Supply, and Benefit 
Withholding: The Role of the Social Security Earnings Test 32 (Univ. of Mich. Ret. 
Research Ctr., Working Paper No. 2008-183, 2008). 
230 BARBARA A. BUTRICA, KAREN E. SMITH & C. EUGENE STEUERLE, WORKING FOR A 
GOOD RETIREMENT 2 (2006), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/311333 
_good_retirement.pdf. 
231 For a discussion of these issues, see infra Part VII. 
232 NATALIA ZHIVAN ET AL., CTR. FOR RET. RESEARCH AT BOS. COLL., AN “ELASTIC” 
EARLIEST ELIGIBILITY AGE FOR SOCIAL SECURITY 2–4 (2008). 
233 Id. at 4. 
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would reduce the value of lifetime benefits more than it does for 
comparable groups.  In the case of African Americans, the lifetime 
value of retirement benefits received is currently 89% of what whites 
receive, and it would decrease to only 87% if the EEA were increased 
to sixty-four.234 
Most studies conclude that adjusting the EEA would not improve 
the Social Security funding problem.235  In fact, one study suggests 
that raising the EEA might slightly increase the Social Security 
deficit. 236 Another report concluded that a two-year increase in the 
EEA would “not have any significant effect on the budget of the 
Social Security system.”237  The reasons for this are that the reduction 
in benefits are calculated to be actuarially fair, so the present value of 
lifetime benefits when retiring at sixty-two with partial benefits would 
roughly equal the present value of lifetime benefits when retiring at 
one’s FRA with full benefits.238 
However, more nuanced studies suggest that trust fund solvency 
could be improved because longer work lives would increase payroll 
tax revenue.  One analysis suggests that the increase in revenues will 
be negligible;239 however, there might be significant residual effects 
in terms of general income tax revenue.  Butrica, Smith, and Steuerle 
predict that, if every nondisabled worker delayed retirement by one 
year, the trust fund deficit would be reduced by 2%, plus it would 
generate an extra $170 billion in general tax revenues.240  Under this 
model, the increase in general revenues and the increase in payroll tax 
revenue together represent 28% of the Social Security deficit.241  Of 
course, raising the EEA would not necessarily result in all workers 
delaying retirement, and the issue of continued labor force 
participation is speculative.242 
 
234 Id. at 3. 
235 Benítez-Silva & Heiland, supra note 229, at 32. 
236 One proposal to gradually increase the EEA from sixty-two to sixty-five was 
projected to actually make the deficit worse by 0.01% of taxable payroll.  Memorandum 
from Steve Goss et al., Soc. Sec. Admin., to John Gist and Sara Rix, AARP Pub. Policy 
Inst. 3 (June 19, 2008), available at http://www.socialsecurity.gov/OACT/solvency 
/AARP_20080619.pdf. 
237 Imrohoroglu & Kitao, supra note 136, at 28. 
238 See supra Part II.B.5. 
239 Imrohoroglu & Kitao, supra note 136, at 22. 
240 BUTRICA, SMITH & STEUERLE, supra note 230, at 17. 
241 Id. 
242 For a discussion of the effect of certain reforms on labor force participation, see 
infra Part VI.A. 
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Some proposals combine an increase in the EEA with changes to 
the FRA.  One plan calls for increasing the EEA in conjunction with 
increases in the FRA in order to maintain a four-year spread.  In this 
scenario, the earliest eligibility date would always be four years away 
from the FRA.  Additionally, the proposal calls for acceleration of the 
scheduled FRA increases plus indexing after the FRA reaches sixty-
seven.243  The deficit could be reduced by 0.56% of taxable payroll, a 
28% reduction.244  The Deficit Commission’s proposal takes a similar 
approach, such that the indexed increase in the FRA also results in an 
increase in the EEA.  Under that approach the spread will be no more 
than five years.245 
One possible outcome of increasing the EEA is that it would 
“likely increase labor supply in the years leading to the new 
[EEA].”246  For early claimers, this would result in higher benefits 
than if the FRA were raised without an adjustment in the EEA.  
Additionally, workers would have the opportunity of saving more 
than if they had retired at the original EEA.  Both outcomes could 
help reduce the poverty level among the elderly, provided that the at-
risk population can remain employed. 
One result of proposed increases in the EEA is to maintain some 
sense of proportion between working years and retirement years, so 
that a certain percentage of life is spent working and a certain 
percentage is spent in retirement, regardless of life expectancy.  
Turner discusses a model where, for every two years of work, there is 
one year of retirement.247  For example, if the average age of entry 
into the workforce were twenty years old and life expectancy were 
eighty, there would be forty years of work and twenty years of 
retirement.  As life expectancy increases, the retirement age 
provisions would adjust to maintain the balance.248  This attempt at 
providing some sort of proportional rule of thumb surrounding time 
 
243 Memorandum from Stephen C. Goss, Soc. Sec. Admin., to Mark Warshawsky 4 
(Sept. 17, 2008), available at http://www.socialsecurity.gov/OACT/solvency/Warshawsky 
_20080917.pdf. 
244 This study used the 2009 Trustee’s Report data, which had not been updated with 
2010 data.  The 28% figure reflects the 0.56% reduction based on a deficit of 2.00 of 
taxable payroll in 2009.  See Actuarial Publications: Summary Measures and Graphs, 
SOC. SEC. ADMIN., http://www.socialsecurity.gov/OACT/solvency/provisions/charts/chart 
_run073.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2011). 
245 See FISCAL COMM’N, THE MOMENT OF TRUTH, supra note 2, at 50. 
246 Benítez-Silva & Heiland, supra note 229, at 32. 
247 TURNER, supra note 229, at 2. 
248 Id. 
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spent working and time spent in retirement creates a sense of fairness 
between generations.  However, the question remains whether the 
increase in life expectancy has also resulted in an increase in work 
capacity. 
While increasing the EEA has been discussed extensively among 
analysts, commentators have previously noted that the policy change 
“appears to have little support.”249  Yet, as the solvency issue 
becomes more urgent, discussion of raising the EEA may find its way 
onto the political agenda.250  Interestingly, the Fiscal Commission’s 
initial draft proposal did not contain a component to increase the 
EEA.251  In the twenty days between the draft and final report, the 
EEA increase must have gained some importance as a bargaining chip 
in the discussions, given its inclusion in the final draft.252 
D.  Proposals to Change the RET and DRC 
Proposals to change the RET and DRC are relevant to reducing the 
Social Security deficit to the degree that changes would increase labor 
force participation and therefore increase tax revenues. 
The RET has been much criticized as constituting an unfair tax on 
older workers.253  The earnings test was originally designed to 
prevent taxpayers from receiving benefits if they were still engaged in 
“gainful employment.”254  This is consistent with the original purpose 
of Social Security benefits, which was to serve as social insurance to 
guard against inadequate income in old age and not as a pension or 
annuity.255  Therefore, the RET is an attempt to “target[] benefits at 
those persons likely to be in need of transfer income to replace lost 
earnings.”256  Critics, however, charge that the RET acts as a 
 
249 Benítez-Silva & Heiland, supra note 229, at 31. 
250 Id. 
251 See CO-CHAIRS’ PROPOSAL: 11.10.10 DRAFT DOCUMENT 44–46 (2010), available 
at http://www.fiscalcommission.gov/sites/fiscalcommission.gov/files/documents/CoChair 
_Draft.pdf. 
252 This is speculation on my part.  The fact that the EEA was not included in the initial 
draft could have been an oversight. 
253 Michael V. Leonesio, Social Security and Older Workers, 56 SOC. SEC. BULL., no. 
2, 1993, at 47, 51. 
254 U.S. SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, supra note 17, at 25. 
255 See Leonesio, supra note 253, at 51. 
256 Id. 
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disincentive to work.257  Much has been written about workers who 
stop or limit work in order to avoid the loss of benefits.258 
Retirees widely consider the RET to be a penalty for working.259  
Many analysts point out that this is a misunderstanding, and workers 
should adjust their behavior because any loss of benefits due to the 
earnings test is later made up by an actuarially fair increase in that 
worker’s benefits after he reaches his FRA.260  Some policy analysts 
contend that most workers, their advisors, and the media do not take 
the increase into account when advising on or making retirement 
decisions,261 but economists disagree on whether the RET actually 
does cause beneficiaries to limit their work.262 
One argument made in this Article is that, if the RET is largely 
misunderstood, then either the Social Security Administration should 
make greater efforts to educate the public about retirement options or 
Congress should modify or eliminate the RET.263  If eliminating the 
RET were to result in greater labor force participation by early 
claimers, two positive economic effects would result: (1) there would 
be enhanced revenues for the Social Security Trust Fund, and (2) 
individuals would be earning additional income that would extend 
their monetary resources into old age, thus reducing the longevity risk 
of outliving one’s resources. 
There are few proposals to increase the DRC.  For the most part, 
the workers who retire late are wealthier, so an increase in the DRC 
would be perceived as shifting benefits to those who are not in need.  
That said, some evidence exists that the current benefit increase given 
by the DRC is not actuarially neutral.  The marginal return in Social 
Security benefits of working an additional year is low for men (except 
for low earners), so there is little to be gained in terms of increased 
benefits for most men, and they might be better off claiming early.264  
In contrast, most women would be better off claiming later. 265 
 
257 See, e.g., id. 
258 See id. 
259 Haider & Loughran, supra note 122, at 57–58. 
260 See id. at 61. 
261 Id. 
262 See id. at 58. 
263 For an analysis of eliminating the RET and how retirement behavior might change, 
see infra Part VI.B–C. 
264 REZNIK, WEAVER & BIGGS, supra note 129, at 1. 
265 Duggan & Soares, supra note 133, at 188–89.  Although the authors use the term 
“actuarial equivalence,” its meaning is the same as how actuarial neutrality or actuarial 
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V 
ABILITY TO RETIRE: FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS AND LONGEVITY 
People are living longer; consequently, Social Security benefits are 
paid out over a longer period of time than in the past, and this has put 
a strain on the financing.266  In this Part, I discuss increased 
longevity, the financial ability to retire, the impact of raising the 
retirement age on poverty rates, and alternatives that might mitigate 
that impact, such as increasing disability benefits and a minimum 
benefit rate. 
A.  Increasing Life Expectancy 
Advocates of an age increase principally argue that, because people 
are living longer and are healthier in old age, they should also work 
for a longer period of time.267  On the face of it, the argument sounds 
reasonable.  From 1940 to 2007, the average life expectancy for men 
at age sixty-five increased 42% from 12.1 to 17.2 years, and for 
women, the average life expectancy increased 46% from 13.6 to 19.9 
years.268  It should be noted that, for purposes of considering 
retirement age reforms, life expectancy increases over time should be 
measured at sixty-five rather than life expectancy at birth.  There have 
been even greater changes in life expectancy at birth since 1940 
because of large declines in infant and teen mortality.269 
While some studies point to the changes since 1940, a more 
appropriate measure of change would be a comparison with 1983 
since that was the last time Congress made comprehensive changes to 
the retirement age.  Since the 1983 Amendments were passed, life 
expectancies at sixty-five for men have increased 19% (from 14.4 
years in 1983 to 17.2 years in 2007) and 7% (from 18.6 years in 1983 
 
fairness is described in much of the Social Security literature (that the present value of 
total benefits is equal regardless of when benefits are claimed). 
266 Terry, supra note 148. 
267 Id. 
268 See Elizabeth Arias, United States Life Tables, 2006, NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP., June 
28, 2010, at 29–30 tbl.11 (providing data from the 1940s); Jiaquan Xu et al., Deaths: Final 
Data for 2007, NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP., May 20, 2010, at 26 tbl.7 (providing data from 
2007). 
269 DAVID ROSNICK, CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH, SOCIAL SECURITY AND 
THE AGE OF RETIREMENT 1 (2010), available at http://www.cepr.net/documents 
/publications/ss-2010-06.pdf. 
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to 19.9 years) for women.270  Even when considering only the 
increase in life expectancy since 1983, enough years have been added 
to life expectancy that the argument for an increase in the retirement 
age gains some merit. 
However, different racial and socioeconomic demographics have 
lower life expectancies.  For example, African Americans have 
shorter life spans; consequently, any increase in the retirement age 
will result in lower benefits for this group.  At birth, whites are 
expected to live 4.8 years longer than African Americans, according 
to 2007 data.271  At sixty-five, the life expectancy for black males is 
only 15.2 years—two years less than that for white males.272  Black 
females have a life expectancy of 18.7 years at age sixty-five 
compared with 19.9 years for white females.273  Interestingly, in 1960 
there was only a small difference in life expectancy between blacks 
and whites at age sixty-five.274  The difference between black and 
white life expectancies at birth widened and reached a high of 7.1 
years in 1989 but has since been on a steady decline.275  As to 
socioeconomic status, a number of studies have confirmed that those 
with higher lifetime income live longer.276  In a study that included 
black and white males and females, researchers found a difference of 
two to three years in life expectancy between low and high income 
groups.277 
One question that arises when looking at disparities is the degree to 
which Social Security should take into account lower life 
expectancies for some subpopulations in the calculation of benefits.  
In other words, even if someone has the capability and ability to 
work, should they be exempt from retirement age increases or 
 
270 See Table 24.  Life Expectancy at Birth, at 65 Years of Age, and at 75 Years of Age, 
by Race and Sex: United States, Selected Years 1900–2007, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL 
& PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus2009tables/Table024.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 29, 2011). 
271 ROSNICK, supra note 269, at 2. 
272 See id. at 26 tbl.7. 
273 Id. 
274 TURNER, supra note 229, at 2. 
275 Xu et al., supra note 268, at 6–8. 
276 James E. Duggan, Robert Gillingham & John S. Greenlees, Mortality and Lifetime 
Income: Evidence from U.S. Social Security Records, 55 IMF STAFF PAPERS 566, 567, 
582–83 (2008), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/staffp/2008/04/pdf 
/duggan.pdf (reviewing the literature and confirming a link between socioeconomic status 
and longevity). 
277 Id. at 568. 
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otherwise have a benefit adjustment because they belong to a 
subpopulation that has a lower life expectancy?  Currently, the 
benefits calculation for Social Security does not explicitly adjust for 
race, gender, or income level; however, the differences in life 
expectancy across these groups can result in an unintended 
redistribution of benefits to higher income workers given their higher 
longevity rate.278 
B.  Financial Ability to Retire and Poverty Rates 
Opponents argue that an increase in the retirement age would 
disproportionally affect some socioeconomic groups who have lower 
life expectancies and would also result in some workers dropping 
below the poverty level because of reduced benefits.279  In particular, 
the benefit cut would have an adverse effect on three subpopulations: 
(1) the poor, (2) those who have to retire early because of poor health 
or incapacity to work, and (3) African Americans because of shorter 
life expectancies.  If benefit reductions result in the retirees slipping 
beneath the poverty line, then the increase in the retirement age would 
be inconsistent with Social Security’s goal of social adequacy in 
retirement for these populations.280 
By most measures, Social Security has been extraordinarily 
effective in combating poverty among the elderly.  The official 
overall poverty rate in the United States for 2009 was 14.3%.281  The 
rate for Americans age sixty-five and older in 2009 is at 8.9%, which 
is nearly 38% below the average rate.282  Some analysts contend that 
the official poverty rate underestimates actual spending needs, and the 
percentage of older workers without adequate income is actually 
higher than the numbers reported.283  The dispute comes in part 
because increases in the poverty level are indexed to prices rather than 
 
278 Id. at 567. 
279 Richard W. Johnson & Gordon B.T. Mermin, Financial Hardship Before and After 
Social Security’s Early Eligibility Age 22–23 (Ctr. for Ret. Research at Bos. Coll., CRR 
WP 2009-8, 2009). 
280 For a discussion of the goal of adequacy, see supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
281 Table 4, People and Families in Poverty by Selected Characteristics: 2008 and 
2009, CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/data/incpovhlth/2009 
/table4.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2011). 
282 The poverty rate of 8.9% among older Americans in 2009 actually decreased 
compared with 9.7% in 2008.  Id.  However, the absolute number of the elderly in poverty 
increased between 2008 and 2009.  The rate, though not the absolute number, in 2009 is 
likely lower because a large number of younger workers became unemployed in 2009. 
283 Johnson & Mermin, supra note 279, at 7. 
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wages.  Because wages rise more quickly than prices over the long 
term, “the gap between the official poverty threshold and the median 
household income has grown.”284  When defining financial hardship 
as 125% of the current poverty rate, the incidence among those aged 
sixty-three to sixty-five rises from 8% to 12%.285 
The lower poverty rate among the elderly is likely due to an 
increase in income from Social Security benefits.  According to some 
estimates, if it weren’t for Social Security payments, 44% of the 
recipients would be living below the poverty level.286  The poverty 
rate increases in the years just before some workers reach the early 
eligibility age of sixty-two and then decreases once those workers 
become eligible for Social Security benefits.  The poverty rate 
increases “about one-third as people age from their early fifties to 
their early sixties,” with most of the increase occurring among low-
skilled, poorly educated workers.287  Research has shown that the 
poverty rate for workers aged sixty to sixty-two is 11%, and it drops 
to 8% for ages sixty-three to sixty-five.288  The drop in the poverty 
rate could be due to other sources of income.  However, investigators 
conclude that, given the populations involved and the early eligibility 
age of sixty-two, it is likely that the decline in the poverty rate is 
attributed to Social Security.289 
Increasing the retirement age lowers benefits; consequently, the 
poverty rate will likely rise for older Americans if they continue to 
retire at an age below their FRA.  Over 73% of all workers claim 
benefits before they reach their FRA,290 and the number claiming at 
sixty-two has been in a relatively stable range of 48% to 52%.291  
While the system provides incentives to some workers to retire 
early,292 one question that arises is the degree to which claiming early 
is voluntary.  Some of the workers who retire at sixty-two do so 
 
284 U.S. SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, supra note 17, at 42. 
285 Johnson & Mermin, supra note 279, at 11. 
286 KATHLEEN ROMIG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM: 
POSSIBLE EFFECTS ON THE ELDERLY POOR AND MITIGATION OPTIONS 1 (2008), available 
at http://www.globalaging.org/elderrights/us/2008/socreform.pdf. 
287 Johnson & Mermin, supra note 279, at 21–22.  Hardship rates for college graduates 
do not change much between their early fifties and early sixties, while the hardship rate for 
adults lacking a high school diploma increases from about “2 in 10” to about “3 in 10.”  Id. 
288 Id. at 11. 
289 Id. 
290 Benítez-Silva & Yin, supra note 131, at 84. 
291 Id. at 80. 
292 See supra Part II.B.5. 
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because of poor health or because of a lack of capacity to work.  
Additionally, some are financially dependent on Social Security to 
keep them above the poverty level. 
An increase in the retirement age would put some workers at risk 
of slipping below the poverty level.293  Workers with low wages and 
a low net worth “are generally more financially dependent on Social 
Security to maintain prior living standards.”294  Typically, the 
workers at risk of poverty at early retirement or before do not have 
other sources of income, such as pension benefits.295  Additionally, 
the incidence of financial hardship is higher among certain 
demographics, including “African Americans, Hispanics, people who 
did not complete high school, . . . unmarried adults[,] . . . adults with 
work-limiting health problems[,] . . . and women.”296  For women, 
employment benefits are 25% below those for males, and single 
women “face up to twice the risk of poverty in retirement than do 
men.”297 
While researchers agree that some workers are at risk of being 
adversely affected, there is wide disagreement about the size of this 
segment of the population.298  The answer to the question can depend 
on how “at risk” is defined.299  At risk is sometimes defined as one or 
a combination of the following factors: (1) being at the poverty level, 
(2) not having a pension other than Social Security, or (3) lacking the 
ability to work.300  More specific factors suggesting risk include 
tracking net worth, income, health, health insurance, and employment 
opportunity.301  If measuring on the basis of poverty alone, one study 
concluded that the at-risk population is about one-quarter to one-third 
of early retirees.302  However, if at risk is defined as requiring both 
“being poor and having a work-limiting disability,” the figure drops 
 
293 Johnson & Mermin, supra note 279, at 23. 
294 Eric R. Kingson & Maria T. Brown, Are Age-62/63 Retired Worker Beneficiaries At 
Risk? 3 (Ctr. for Ret. Research at Bos. Coll., CRR WP 2009-13, 2009). 
295 Johnson & Mermin, supra note 279, at 4. 
296 Id. at 11. 
297 Kingson & Brown, supra note 294, at 5. 
298 Id. at 3. 
299 Id. at 6. 
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TEMPLIN 5/2/2011  11:17 AM 
1222 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89, 1179 
down to 10%.303  Yet another study establishes that the number of at-
risk workers is only 3%.304 
For purposes of this analysis, I adopt the measure of an at-risk 
population as one that includes both being poor and having a work-
limiting disability.  While poverty and unemployment among the poor 
is a serious social issue, the personal responsibility component found 
within the value system of Social Security305 should require people in 
financial need of a job to continue to work if they have the capacity 
and ability to find a job.306  While Social Security is one tool to 
address poverty rates among the elderly, other government programs 
can and should address the problem as well.  To the extent that an age 
increase raises the poverty rate for those unable to work, a minimum 
benefit could mitigate if not reduce the number of people in 
poverty.307 
C.  Sources of Retirement Income 
One of the recent challenges facing policy makers is assessing the 
role that Social Security plays in retirement income.  In other words, 
policy makers need to answer the following question: To what extent 
is Social Security meant to replace income?  Traditionally, Social 
Security was never meant to provide the sole source of retirement 
income.308  The government’s retirement policy has been famously 
analogized “as a ‘three-legged stool,’ with Social Security 
representing one of the legs and employer-sponsored pension plans 
and individual savings representing the other two legs.”309  On 
average, Social Security’s income replacement rate—the income in 
retirement as a proportion of pre-retirement income—is around 40%, 
though the rate is expected to decline to around 36% by 2030.310  
Given that Social Security is designed as a safety net rather than a 
retirement plan, workers need to be personally responsible for their 
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304 TURNER, supra note 229, at 5. 
305 See infra note 311 and accompanying text. 
306 See infra Part VII. 
307 See infra notes 345–48 and accompanying text. 
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310 ALICIA H. MUNNELL, ANTHONY WEBB & FRANCESCA GOLUB-SASS, CTR. FOR RET. 
RESEARCH AT BOS. COLL., THE NATIONAL RETIREMENT RISK INDEX: AFTER THE CRASH 
2 fig.1 (2009), available at http://crr.bc.edu/images/stories/Briefs/IB_9-22.pdf. 
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retirement income, proactively save for old age, and participate in 
employee pension plans, or they will face financial hardship.311 
The second source of retirement income, employee-sponsored 
pension plans, has changed dramatically in the last twenty-five years 
as employee-sponsored defined-benefit pension plans have largely 
been replaced with defined-contribution plans, such as 401(k)s.312  
Under defined-benefit plans, retirees receive a guaranteed benefit 
even if it exceeds their contribution rate.  Whereas, in a defined-
contribution plan, workers’ benefits are limited by the amount they 
contribute and the proceeds from any investments made from their 
contributions.  Since 1979, there has been a dramatic shift from 
defined-benefit plans to defined-contribution plans, such as Individual 
Retirement Accounts (IRAs) and 401(k)s.313  Defined-contribution 
plans are subject to market fluctuations, and workers who have the 
bad luck to retire on the cusp of a recession or market downturn face a 
higher risk of having their retirement savings depleted before they 
die.314 
As for savings, in the last ten years, surveys report that a declining 
number of workers overall are saving for retirement, though older 
workers have increased their savings.315  The percentage of all 
workers saving for retirement dropped from 78% in 2000 to 69% in 
2010.316  However, the percentage of workers aged fifty-five and up 
saving for retirement increased from 66% in 2000 to 81% in 2010.317  
The actual savings for Americans is a puny 5% of disposable income, 
despite survey results suggesting that workers want to save for 
 
311 Melissa A. Z. Knoll, The Role of Behavioral Economics and Behavioral Decision 
Making in Americans’ Retirement Savings Decisions, 70 SOC. SEC. BULL., no. 4, 2010, at 
1. 
312 See id. 
313 See EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., FACTS FROM EBRI: RETIREMENT TRENDS IN 
THE UNITED STATES OVER THE PAST QUARTER-CENTURY 1 (2007), available at  http:// 
www.ebri.org/pdf/publications/facts/0607fact.pdf (showing that traditional defined-benefit 
plans now account for only 10% of retirement plans (compared with 62% in 1979) and 
defined contribution plans represent 63% of all plans (compared with only 16% in 1979)). 
314 See Wade D. Pfau, Will 2000-Era Retirees Experience the Worst Retirement 
Outcomes in U.S. History? A Progress Report After 10 Years 2 (Nat’l Graduate Inst. for 
Policy Studies, Working Paper, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1717283. 
315 EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST. & MATHEW GREENWALD & ASSOC., RETIREMENT 
CONFIDENCE SURV., 2010 RCS FACT SHEET #4: AGE COMPARISONS AMONG WORKERS 1 
(2010), available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/surveys/rcs/2010/FS-04_RCS-10_Age.pdf. 
316 Id. 
317 Id. 
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retirement.318  Part of this trend can be explained by the behavioral 
economics literature, which has found that people do not behave as 
rational economic actors and often make poor financial decisions 
despite best intentions to do otherwise.319 
Given Social Security’s declining replacement rate and the risks 
involved with defined contribution plans, retirees need to accept 
“personal financial responsibility” for their retirement savings or risk 
being left without adequate resources.320  Policy makers can help, 
however, by creating incentives to retire later and by designing 
savings systems that will encourage workers to save for retirement.321  
Advocates of an increase in the FRA maintain that there are benefits 
to providing incentives for workers to retire later because working 
longer “substantially increases worker’s retirement well-being.”322  In 
addition to the increased Social Security benefits that would come 
from a later retirement, workers could also acquire additional savings 
for retirement, and, by working longer, there is a shorter time period 
over which workers would draw upon their non–Social Security 
resources.323  While workers sacrifice some leisure time by working 
longer, this may be offset for some people who gain “improved 
physical and mental well-being” by continuing to work.324 
One study estimated that, by delaying retirement and staying in the 
labor force, workers could increase their annual retirement income by 
roughly 9% for one extra year worked and 56% for five years of 
additional work.325  For low income workers, the increase is even 
more dramatic.  One extra year in the workforce increases retirement 
income by 16%, and five extra years increases it by 98%.326  The 
dramatic difference is partially explained by the higher mortality rates 
among poor people, because additional income is spread out over 
fewer years.327 
 
318 Knoll, supra note 311, at 2–3. 
319 Id. at 1–3. 
320 Id. at 1. 
321 See infra notes 531–34 and accompanying text. 
322 BUTRICA, SMITH & STEUERLE, supra note 230, at 1. 
323 REZNIK, WEAVER & BIGGS, supra note 129, at 2. 
324 BUTRICA, SMITH & STEUERLE, supra note 230, at 5. 
325 Id. at 13. 
326 Id. at 14. 
327 Id. 
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D.  Mitigating the Impact: Minimum Benefits and Disability 
Given that some populations—the less educated and minorities—
would be adversely affected by an increase in the retirement age, 
proponents of an increase in the FRA suggest any adjustment should 
be accompanied by an “expansion of eligibility for disability 
insurance”328 or the introduction of a minimum benefit for those who 
don’t qualify for disability.329 
To the degree that a worker must retire early because of health 
problems, disability insurance may be an alternative way to finance 
retirement.  Disability benefits for workers under Social Security 
Disability Insurance (SSDI) are considered “more generous” than 
regular Social Security benefits for workers aged between sixty-two 
and their FRA because SSDI benefits equal the full Social Security 
benefit as if the worker had retired at his FRA without any actuarial 
reduction.330 
Concern has been raised that another increase in the FRA will 
create incentives for workers in physically demanding jobs to apply 
for disability at an early eligibility age, even if they are not 
technically disabled.  To the extent that an increase in applications 
results in an increase in disability benefits granted, these increased 
payouts may harm the gains sought by increasing the FRA.331  
Loosening the disability rules so that more workers qualify will result 
in higher outflows than if the present system is maintained. 
Based on past increases to the FRA, there do not appear to be 
significant consequences in terms of rising disability application rates.  
For every four-month increase in the FRA, the disability application 
rate rose only 0.34% when considering workers who were affected by 
the FRA increase.332  As might be expected, the increase in the 
application rate among workers with health problems was 
significantly greater, but still only 0.77%.333 What effect does this 
have on assumptions about cost savings by increasing the FRA?  It 
 
328 DAVID CUTLER, ESTIMATING WORK CAPACITY AMONG NEAR ELDERLY AND 
ELDERLY MEN 13 (2009), available at https://docs.google.com/viewer?url=http://www 
.nber.org/programs/ag/rrc/09-18%2520Cutler%2520FINAL.pdf. 
329 Gordon B.T. Mermin & C. Eugene Steuerle, Would Raising the Social Security 
Retirement Age Harm Low-Income Groups?, URBAN INST. BRIEF SERIES, no. 19, 2006, at 
1. 
330 Li, supra note 196, at 2–6. 
331 Id. at 2–3. 
332 Id. 
333 Id. at 33. 
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may be negligible, but a two-year increase in the FRA might reduce 
the predicted cost savings by 3.2%.334 
Would disability be an effective alternative for those who presently 
have to retire at sixty-two because they lack the capacity to work?  
Disability may not be available for everyone whose benefits are 
reduced dramatically by an age increase.  Most people who need the 
additional assistance will also be deemed “‘too healthy’ to meet the 
SSA’s definition of disability.”335  Qualifying for disability requires 
that applicants “navigate an arduous and unpredictable application 
process” where the outcome is not certain given rigid 
requirements.336  Additionally, not everyone who is insured under 
Social Security is also insured under SSDI.  SSDI eligibility 
requirements vary by age but generally require that a worker has 
recently paid a minimum amount into SSDI.337  So, for example, a 
worker who is sixty-two may have Social Security eligibility because 
he accumulated forty quarters of covered employment.  However, in 
order to qualify for disability, twenty of those quarters of covered 
employment must have been in the last ten years.338 
In addition to SSDI, other government programs might also 
supplement the income of the very poor.  For example, Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI) is based on financial need, rather than work 
history.339  Unlike SSDI, which is funded by the payroll tax, SSI is 
funded by general tax revenues.340  However, SSI is administered by 
the Social Security Administration, so sometimes the terms SSDI and 
SSI are used interchangeably.341  SSI is not available until age sixty-
five unless a person is blind or physically or mentally disabled.342  
Those eligible for SSI are usually eligible for other programs as well, 
such as food stamps and Medicaid.343 
Because many at-risk workers will likely not qualify for disability, 
some proponents of an increase in the FRA try to address concerns 
 
334 Id. at 32. 
335 Id. at 34. 
336 Johnson & Mermin, supra note 279, at 1. 
337 See Li, supra note 196, at 4. 
338 Id. 
339 What Is the Difference Between SSI and SSDI?, WISEGEEK, www.wisegeek.com 
/what-is-the-difference-between-ssi-and-ssdi.htm (last updated Jan. 20, 2011). 
340 Id. 
341 Id. 
342 Li, supra note 196, at 2 n.2. 
343 What Is the Difference Between SSI and SSDI?, supra note 339. 
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about the adverse impact by proposing a minimum benefit provision 
and a hardship exemption to increases in the retirement age.344  The 
Fiscal Commission’s December 2010 report included a minimum 
benefit provision that “provides full-career (30-year) minimum wage 
workers with a benefit equivalent to 125 percent of the poverty line in 
2017 and wage-indexed thereafter.”345  According to other studies, 
the addition of a minimum benefit to an increase would certainly 
mitigate—if not eliminate—the effect of an increase in the retirement 
age.346  Under one plan that envisions increasing the FRA to seventy 
and two months and the EEA to sixty-five, a minimum benefit 
component could actually improve the current Social Security lifetime 
benefits of poor workers by 6%.347 
In addition to the minimum benefit, the Fiscal Commission also 
proposed the creation of a hardship exemption to increases in the 
EEA and FRA.348  Under this proposal, workers who do not qualify 
for either SSDI or SSI but who are otherwise unable to work past 
sixty-two could start to claim benefits without any additional actuarial 
reduction than that which already exists.349 
VI 
EMPLOYMENT TRENDS AMONG THE ELDERLY 
If advocates of reform are correct, increasing the retirement age 
should cause people to delay retirement and stay in the workforce 
longer.  A spate of new studies in the economics literature address the 
issue of whether increases in the FRA and other factors from the 1983 
Amendments were the cause of a rise in the number of older workers 
in the labor force.350  Most studies conclude that the increase in the 
retirement age that resulted from the 1983 Amendments was one of 
the important factors that caused an increase in labor participation 
 
344 U.S. SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, supra note 17, at 52, 55–64. 
345 FISCAL COMM’N, THE MOMENT OF TRUTH, supra note 2, at 50. 
346 Mermin & Steuerle, supra note 329, at 4.  Depending on the size of the minimum 
benefit, there could be a reduction in the poverty rate.  Id. 
347 Id. at 4–5. 
348 FISCAL COMM’N, THE MOMENT OF TRUTH, supra note 2, at 50–51. 
349 Id.  The Fiscal Commission would charge the SSA with developing eligibility 
criteria, which would likely include “factors such as the physical demands of labor and 
lifetime earnings.”  Id. at 51.  Other reform proposals have shown that lifetime earnings 
can be a good indicator of capacity to work.  See infra notes 510–16 and accompanying 
text. 
350 Benítez-Silva & Yin, supra note 131, at 77–78. 
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among the elderly, though subsequent changes in the DRC and RET 
are also credited with affecting the increase. 
A.  Labor Force Participation 
Labor force participation (LFP) rates for older men351 were 
moving downward from the 1960s until the mid-1990s when the trend 
reversed itself.  The downward trend coincided with an increase in 
Social Security benefits, and the reversal coincided with the 
implementation of the 1983 Amendments, which provided incentives 
for later retirement and penalties for early retirement.352  Given the 
coincidence, policy analysts have tried to determine whether the 
coinciding trends and policy changes to Social Security are correlated.  
That determination has important implications in accurately 
predicting the impact of future FRA increases on behavior. 
Labor force participation among older men declined significantly 
during the latter half of the twentieth century.  The labor force 
participation rate for men aged fifty-five to sixty-nine fell from 
approximately 75% in 1962 to about 70% in the early 1970s, and then 
it rapidly declined to 55% in the mid-1980s.353  The rate hovered 
around 55% until 1994 when the trend reversed itself and climbed 
back to around 60% by 2004.354  The studies on the effect of the 
retirement age on LFP focus on men because other societal trends are 
generally credited with a significant increase in LFP among women 
during the same period.  In the latter half of the twentieth century, the 
labor force participation rate of women tripled as more women began 
pursuing careers.355 
One question facing researchers is whether the decline in LFP 
among older men was due to the increases in benefits that occurred 
from the mid-1960s through the mid-1970s.  However, there is 
disagreement among economists as to the degree to which the benefits 
increase accounted for the decrease in LFP.  Stewart concludes that 
up to 40% of the decline can be explained by men leaving the 
 
351 The economic studies tend to focus on older men rather combining data on both 
genders because of the belief that some married women base their labor participation 
decision not only on their own FRA but also on their husband’s FRA because many claim 
spousal benefits.  Li, supra note 196, at 47. 
352 Blau & Goodstein, supra note 193, at 329. 
353 Id. at 338 fig.2. 
354 Id. 
355 Id. at 332. 
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workforce because of the increase in benefits.356  However, Blau and 
Goodstein found that the increased benefits accounted for only 16% 
of the decline357 and concluded that the decline in LFP “would have 
been substantial even if there had been no changes in Social Security 
retirement rules.”358  Numerous other studies using different time 
periods, cohorts, data sets, and models have found varying results 
ranging from benefit changes having only a 7% influence to 100%.359 
Most studies conclude that the rise in Social Security benefits had 
only a little influence on the decline in labor force participation.360  
There is wide agreement that the degree to which one’s Social 
Security benefits provide a sense of security becomes a factor in the 
decision of whether to leave the workforce.361  However, Social 
Security benefits alone are not significant enough to account for that 
sense of security.  The decline in LFP during this period probably 
occurred because the growth in real wages made retiring earlier more 
affordable.362 
The more pressing question facing policy makers is the degree to 
which the retirement age provisions in the 1983 Amendments and 
subsequent reforms were behind the increases in LFP.  Several studies 
conducted within the last five years demonstrate that the increase in 
worker participation in the labor force that started in the mid-1990s is 
correlated with the rise in the FRA from sixty-five to sixty-seven.363  
The studies vary substantially in the data sets used,364 methodologies, 
and reporting criteria, which makes comparison of the results 
difficult.  However, the multiple methodologies lend credence to the 
generally agreed conclusion that the rise in both the FRA and LFP 
among older men is correlated. 
 
356 Id. at 331. 
357 Id. at 355. 
358 Id. at 348. 
359 Id. at 330–31. 
360 Id. 
361 Kingson & Brown, supra note 294, at 7. 
362 Blau & Goodstein, supra note 193, at 331.  However, the growth in real wages 
continued during the period in which the LFP rate for men reversed and started to climb.  
Id. 
363 See MacInnis, supra note 126, at 1. 
364 See Li, supra note 196, at 50, 57, 65.  There are a variety of data sets that economists 
use, including the 1994–2009 Basic Monthly Current Population Survey (CPS), Survey of 
Income and Program Participation (SIPP), and the Health and Retirement Study (HRS).  
See id. 
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To what degree did the changes in Social Security benefits drive 
the decision, or were there other factors influencing the decision?  
Blau and Goodstein found that, for men aged fifty-five to sixty-nine, 
LFP rose 4.7% from 1988 to 2005.365  The researchers concluded that 
changes in both the FRA and DRC were responsible for anywhere 
from a quarter to half of the increase and were “the single most 
important factor in accounting for rising LFP of older men, but not 
the only factor.”366  Other factors affecting the increase in LFP 
include average lifetime earnings, a spouse’s decision on whether to 
retire, and education level.367  Other studies confirm the results.368  
Gustman and Steinmeier concluded that, when taking into account all 
reforms in Social Security benefits, the effect was to increase LFP 
from 2% to 4% depending on age.369 
The effect of the DRC is a matter of substantial disagreement.  
Pingle focused on the effect of changes in the DRC over time on 
employment rates among the elderly and concluded that the effect of 
increases in the incentive to work longer was “substantial—every 
percentage point increase in the DRC led to a percentage point 
increase in the employment rate of men age 65 to 70.”370  However, 
Benítez-Silva and Yin focused on claiming behavior and concluded 
that the DRC had little effect on LFP rates because the claiming 
behavior among those older than sixty-five decreased slightly since 
increases in the DRC were implemented.371 
In addition to higher incidences of labor force participation, the 
percentage of men who claim benefits without working has 
decreased.372  The incidence of nonworking beneficiaries dropped 
from 67.5% in 1995 to 57.9% in 2006, showing a 15% decline.373  
The drop was most pronounced among the sixty-two to sixty-four age 
 
365 Blau & Goodstein, supra note 193, at 349, 351 tbl.6. 
366 Id. at 349. 
367 Id. 
368 See, e.g., Mastrobuoni, supra note 139, at 1224 (finding that older male workers 
delayed their retirement in response to increases in the FRA and that “the mean retirement 
age . . . increased by about half as much as the increase in the [FRA]”). 
369 Alan L. Gustman & Thomas Steinmeier, How Changes in Social Security Affect 
Recent Retirement Trends, 31 RES. ON AGING 261, 286 (2009). 
370 Jonathan F. Pingle, Social Security’s Delayed Retirement Credit and the Labor 
Supply of Older Men 26 (Div. of Research & Statistics & Monetary Affairs, Fed. Reserve 
Bd., Working Paper No. 2006-37, 2006). 
371 Benítez-Silva & Yin, supra note 131, at 81. 
372 MacInnis, supra note 126, at 1. 
373 Id. at 10. 
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group.374  Additionally, the percentage of non-beneficiary workers 
climbed from 9.8% in 1995 to 15.1% in 2006, registering a 54% 
increase.375  Again, the largest percentage decline occurred in 
younger workers—the sixty-two to sixty-four group who are eligible 
for early retirement—thus showing an increase in the percentage of 
workers opting to wait until their FRA or later to claim benefits.376  
One study confirmed the trend and found that a one-year increase in 
the FRA could reduce the probability of electing early retirement at 
sixty-two by 8.5% for men and 7.3% for women.377 
B.  Retirement Earnings Test: A Disincentive to Work? 
Another factor that might affect labor force participation is the 
retirement earnings test (RET).378  As the FRA increases to sixty-
seven by 2022, the number of workers potentially subject to the RET 
will increase dramatically.379  If the FRA is raised to sixty-eight or 
seventy, the RET will apply to an even greater number of workers.  
Therefore, two important policy questions are (1) whether the 
earnings test affects LFP and (2) whether the RET affects the number 
of early claimers.  If the RET keeps workers out of the labor force and 
the elimination of the RET brings workers into the labor force, a 
reasonable policy change would be to eliminate the RET entirely in 
order to increase Social Security payroll tax revenue and savings for 
workers who elect to remain in the workforce. 
The economics literature is split on whether changes to the RET 
affected the labor supply.380  Most early studies suggest that prior 
reforms to the RET had little effect on the labor supply of older 
males.381  However, in a more recent study, Haider and Loughran 
suggest that dropping the RET in 2000 had a “substantial effect on 
male labor supply” in that “at least 4.8 percent of workers adjust their 
earnings in response to the earnings test.”382  The study confirmed 
 
374 Id. 
375 Id. 
376 Id. at 9. 
377 Jae Song & Joyce Manchester, Revisiting the 1983 Social Security Reforms, 25 
Years Later, 31 RES. ON AGING 233, 257 (2009). 
378 See supra Part II.B.4 (providing an overview of the RET). 
379 See Benítez-Silva & Heiland, supra note 229, at 1, 4. 
380 See Haider & Loughran, supra note 122, at 58. 
381 Id. 
382 Id. at 81. 
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that some workers saw the RET as a disincentive to work and reduced 
their hours so that their income was at the threshold where no benefit 
reduction would take place.383  As workers age and get to the point 
that the RET no longer applies, earnings go up.384 
Those who support the RET point out that the test does not 
permanently deprive an individual of a benefit because future benefits 
are increased through an actuarially fair calculation.  However, it 
appears that workers do not fully understand the increase and simply 
view the RET as a disincentive to work.385  These results suggest that 
workers’ behavioral response to the RET is to decrease their LFP 
when the RET applies and to increase their LFP when the RET no 
longer applies.386 
Policy makers who are opposed to eliminating the RET argue that 
the RET discourages workers from retiring early, and if the RET is 
removed, there will be an increase in early claimers.387  An increase 
in early claimers would be undesirable for low wage earners because 
early claiming results in lower benefits and hence a greater likelihood 
of being below the poverty level in old age.388 
Yet, the presence of the RET has resulted in behavior that does not 
necessarily maximize income for working beneficiaries.  Some 
workers who claim early reduce their income to avoid the benefit 
reduction and then reenter the workforce upon reaching their FRA; 
however, older workers generally have more difficulty finding new 
jobs and have to accept lower salaries when work is found.389 
Older workers who claim early would be in a better position in 
terms of salary and job security if they were to keep their jobs rather 
than quit or reduce hours during the early claiming period.  Given the 
LFP patterns attributed to the RET, some analysts have concluded 
that the RET is widely considered a disincentive for older Americans 
to work and constitutes “an unfair tax on the earnings of older 
workers.”390  If the policy goal is to maximize lifetime LFP in order 
 
383 Id. at 74–75. 
384 Id. at 75. 
385 See id. at 59, 61. 
386 See id. at 81. 
387 Benítez-Silva & Heiland, supra note 229, at 32; MacInnis, supra note 126, at 5. 
388 Anzick & Weaver, supra note 127, at 6–7. 
389 See infra Part VII (discussing work capacity and ability to find employment). 
390 Haider & Loughran, supra note 122, at 58. 
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to provide enough income security during retirement, then eliminating 
the RET entirely would be consistent with that goal. 
C.  Conclusions 
Economists seem to agree that the increase in the FRA boosts the 
probability that workers will not retire early, though there is 
disagreement over the degree to which increases in the FRA affect 
LFP.391  Additionally, the DRC increases monthly benefits to those 
who delay retirement,392 thereby increasing the probability that 
workers will delay retirement.  In contrast, the RET has a negative 
effect on worker participation rates.393 
While economists seem to agree that the 1983 Amendments 
resulted in an increase in the labor force among older men, that does 
not necessarily mean that the trend will continue.  Blau and Goodstein 
predict that absent any changes, the rate of growth in LFP among 
older men will slow down rather than accelerate.394  In their view, 
many of the factors that have driven an increase in LFP—such as the 
1983 Amendments and an increase in education—have already 
worked their way into the decision-making process of older men.395  
In order to further increase LFP, additional changes would need to be 
made to the FRA and DRC. 
While the 1983 Amendments seem to have positively increased 
LFP, most studies agree that there are many other factors at work in 
the retirement decision.  Li concluded that the increase in the labor 
force may not be a direct result of the increase in the FRA but “the 
result of a complex combination of birth cohort, time, and age 
effects.”396  Li identified 
potentially confounding trends [that] include: the rise in average 
educational attainment, the cross-cohort trend among women 
towards higher labor force participation rate, improvement in health 
status and life expectancy, the decline in traditional employer-
sponsored defined benefit (DB) plans (and the rise in defined 
 
391 MacInnis, supra note 126, at 4. 
392 Id. at 1. 
393 Haider & Loughran, supra note 122, at 58 (discussing the Friedberg study). 
394 Blau & Goodstein, supra note 193, at 356. 
395 Id. at 355–56. 
396 Li, supra note 196, at 49. 
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contribution (DC) plans), the decline in physically demanding jobs, 
and the reduction in employer-sponsored retiree health benefits.397 
Additionally, MacInnis suggested that other factors include 
“preferences for work, capacity to work, and perceptions of mortality 
risks and the security of future retirement benefits.”398  The next Part 
will explore other factors that might influence the retirement decision. 
VII 
CAPACITY TO WORK AND ABILITY TO FIND EMPLOYMENT 
Even though people are living longer, are they healthy enough to 
work at older ages?  What are the trends in terms of physically 
demanding jobs for older workers?  Even if older workers are healthy 
enough, can they find employment given the character of the labor 
market for older workers?  These issues have also been the focus of 
recent research as well as ongoing longitudinal studies on the health 
and welfare of older Americans.399 
A.  Health 
Health is the second most important factor in the decision to retire 
early.400  Poor health has “a large negative impact on LFP.”401  
Common health problems, such as heart conditions, strokes, and 
psychological difficulties, reduce employment by 30% to 50% for 
older men.402  Because health declines with age, one naturally expects 
capacity to work to decline as well.  However, if work capacity 
among elderly workers is improving, that suggests the FRA or EEA 
could be increased.403 
 
397 Id. at 56. 
398 MacInnis, supra note 126, at 19. 
399 A wealth of research and data has been collected through the U.S. Health and 
Retirement Study (HRS)—a government-funded longitudinal study of the economic and 
health conditions of older Americans that has been conducted since 1992.  NAT’L INST. ON 
AGING & NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, GROWING OLDER IN AMERICA: THE HEALTH & 
RETIREMENT STUDY 10 (2007) [hereinafter GROWING OLDER IN AMERICA].  Although the 
HRS survey has allowed numerous researchers to look at the overall trends of health 
among the elderly as well as among subpopulations, there are a variety of other data 
models used as well. 
400 Kingson & Brown, supra note 294, at 7. 
401 Blau & Goodstein, supra note 193, at 346–47. 
402 CUTLER, supra note 328, at 10. 
403 Id. 
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Generally, health among the elderly has improved since the 1983 
Amendments.  One study reports that the percentage of older 
Americans reporting their health as either fair or poor has dropped 
from 24% (for women) and 23% (for men) in 1982 to 16% (for both 
genders) in 2005.404  The incidence of disability among elderly 
Americans has steadily and dramatically decreased since 1984 with 
the number of elderly reporting that they could not operate 
independently dropping from 26.2% in 1984 to 19.0% in 2004.405  
While there has been heightened awareness of the problem of 
dementia in recent years, the actual incidence of significant cognitive 
impairment for the elderly decreased from 1993 to 2002.406  The 
general improvement in health has been attributed to better health 
care,407 reduced exposure to diseases during childhood,408 improved 
lifestyles,409 a reduction in occupational hazards,410 and better 
education.411 
However, studies differ on the degree to which the health-related 
capacity to work among the elderly is improving.412  One report 
found that, although older workers are slightly healthier than in 
previous generations, “the difference is not statistically 
significant.”413  Another study found only small improvement in 
 
404 TURNER, supra note 229, at 3 fig.3A. 
405 ALICIA H. MUNNELL & JERILYN LIBBY, CTR. FOR RET. RESEARCH AT BOS. 
COLL.WILL PEOPLE BE HEALTHY ENOUGH TO WORK LONGER? 3 (2007), available at 
http://crr.bc.edu/images/stories/Briefs/ib_2007-3.pdf. 
406 Kenneth M. Langa et al., Trends in the Prevalence and Mortality of Cognitive 
Impairment in the United States: Is There Evidence of a Compression of Cognitive 
Morbidity?, 4 ALZHEIMER’S & DEMENTIA 134, 137 (2008) (stating that, for people 
seventy and older, the incidence of cognitive impairment dropped from 12.2% in 1993 to 
8.7% in 2002). 
407 MUNNELL & LIBBY, supra note 405, at 4 (stating that medical advances in the 
diagnosis and treatment of arthritis, heart disease, and stroke have improved the health of 
the elderly). 
408 Id. (stating that studies have shown that the incidence of disease in childhood is 
linked to health problems later in life). 
409 Id. (stating that fewer people are smoking and that diabetics are taking better care of 
themselves, thereby reducing the risk of health problems). 
410 Id. (stating that blue-collar workers experience more health problems than white-
collar workers, and the reduction in physically demanding jobs has been a factor in the 
improved health of the elderly). 
411 Id. at 5 (suggesting that the increase in the average education level is tied to better 
health because “more educated people will follow what can be complicated regimens and 
better manage their diseases”). 
412 CUTLER, supra note 328, at 12. 
413 Li, supra note 196, at 65. 
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work capacity among the elderly in 2006 when compared with the 
same age ranges in 1996.414  Recent research also suggests that the 
decline since the 1980s in the disability rate among older Americans 
may be reversing.  When taking into account only people living in the 
community and not those in institutions, the rate of disability to 
perform daily activities rose 9% from 2000 to 2005.415  This increase, 
however, reflects that fewer people are using long-term care facilities 
because more living options have developed in recent years for people 
who have moderate health problems.416 
A third study takes a more positive note and concludes that, 
although work capacity naturally declines with age, male workers 
have a high capacity for work through their mid-seventies.417  From 
age fifty-five to sixty-five, male workers experience only an 8% 
decline in capacity to work.418  Between ages fifty-five and seventy-
five, the decline in work capacity is only 20%.419  After age seventy-
five, work capacity declines rapidly.420  The absolute numbers are 
more telling.  At age fifty-five, the predicted work capacity is 75%, 
which slips to 69% at age sixty-five and 60% at age seventy-five.421 
As with life expectancy, less-educated males and African 
Americans fare worse than their counterparts.  For both groups, work 
capacity is 10% to 20% worse among less-educated men and 10% to 
15% worse for African American males.422  For both groups, the 
reason for low work capacity is health related.423 
Additionally, a correlation exists between health and income.  The 
Health & Retirement Study reported that people who were in 
excellent health had a mean income over twice that of those who were 
in poor health.424  Measuring household wealth with health showed 
an even greater disparity.  Married couples in excellent health had an 
 
414 CUTLER, supra note 328, at 10, 22 fig.4. 
415 E. Fuller-Thomson et al., Basic ADL Disability and Functional Limitation Rates 
Among Older Americans from 2000–2005: The End of the Decline?, 64 J. GERONTOLOGY 
1333, 1334 (2009). 
416 Id. at 1335. 
417 CUTLER, supra note 328, at 12. 
418 Id. 
419 Id. 
420 Id. at 9. 
421 Id. at 18. 
422 Id. at 13. 
423 Id. at 11. 
424 GROWING OLDER IN AMERICA, supra note 399, at 60–61 figs.3 & 4. 
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average household wealth three times that of couples in poor health, 
and singles in excellent health were fives time wealthier on average 
than singles in poor health.425 
Some concern has been voiced over the rise in obesity and 
diabetes, which could indicate a reversal of the trend of better health 
for the elderly.426  One study has concluded that members of the baby 
boom generation “on the verge of retirement are in poorer health 
[than] their counterparts 12 years ago”427 and “are less accepting of 
physiological changes that are not pathologic.”428  If the health 
problems persist for the baby boom generation, the general trend 
toward an improvement in capacity to work among the elderly may 
reverse.  That said, to the extent that the health problems are the result 
of personal behavior—e.g., nongenetic related obesity—those 
suffering have the capacity to make changes in order to increase their 
capacity to work. 
Although a majority of workers retire earlier than their FRA, 
enough evidence shows that “work capacity remains high even 
through age 74.”429  When considering the population at large, there 
is no health-related reason that the potential benefit cut by raising the 
retirement age could not be absorbed by requiring beneficiaries to 
work longer.  To the extent that work capacity varies among different 
subpopulations, the proposals of expanded disability benefits and a 
hardship exception to increases in the retirement age would help 
mitigate the impact.430 
B.  Physically Demanding Jobs 
Advocates of a retirement age increase also point to the decrease in 
physically demanding jobs as another trend that allows people to 
 
425 Id. 
426 MUNNELL & LIBBY, supra note 405, at 6. 
427 Beth J. Soldo et al., Cross-Cohort Differences in Health on the Verge of Retirement 
17 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12762, 2006) (reporting that baby 
boomers experience “more pain, more chronic conditions, [and] more drinking and 
psychiatric problems” than earlier generations). 
428 Id. at 17–18 (hypothesizing that the rise in health complaints among the baby boom 
generation may be attributed to heightened awareness of ancillary medical conditions 
because of more frequent visits to the doctor than previous generations, an increase in 
medical advertising, and changes in societal views of health care). 
429 CUTLER, supra note 328, at 14. 
430 See supra Part V.D (discussing mitigation proposals). 
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work longer.431  Over the last sixty years, the nature of most jobs has 
changed significantly from “blue collar and agricultural employment 
to professional and white collar employment.”432  The degree to 
which there is a trend toward less physically demanding jobs is 
important because workers in such jobs tend to retire early433 and 
therefore would sustain a benefit cut if the retirement age were 
increased.434 
The results from the different studies vary as to what percentage of 
the population remains in physically demanding jobs.  Results might 
depend on how the term “physically demanding” is defined.435  
Despite varying definitions, the trend towards less physically 
demanding jobs is clear.  One study suggested that between 1982 and 
2002 physically demanding labor went from 47% to 19% for men and 
29% to 17% for women.436  However, in a more nuanced study, 
Johnson, Mermin, and Resseger reported that jobs requiring some 
degree of physical activity fell from 57% in 1971 to 46% in 2006.437  
Yet, the study did conclude that a relatively small number of 
workers—only 7%—held “jobs that imposed high general physical 
demands.”438  Additionally, the authors project that the percentage of 
physically demanding jobs will continue to decline to about 5% of the 
population by 2041.439 
However, the authors found that 25% of workers had jobs that 
involved “difficult working conditions,” such as exposure to harsh 
weather, high noise, or contaminants.440  Not surprisingly, the study 
determined that African Americans and Hispanics were more likely to 
work in physically demanding jobs, and one third of Hispanics were 
employed in occupations that had difficult working conditions.441 
 
431 Moore, supra note 18, at 582. 
432 Id. at 581. 
433 RICHARD W. JOHNSON ET AL., EMPLOYMENT AT OLDER AGES AND THE CHANGING 
NATURE OF WORK 3 (2007), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/1001154 
_older_ages.pdf. 
434 RHO, supra note 152, at 2. 
435 Id. at 3. 
436 TURNER, supra note 229, at 4 fig.4. 
437 JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 433, at vii. 
438 Id. at vi. 
439 Id. at 11 (projecting a decrease of an additional two percentage points from the 
current 7% proportion of physically demanding jobs). 
440 Id. at vi. 
441 Id. at 9. 
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While Johnson, Mermin, and Resseger confirmed the well-
established trend that jobs are becoming less physically demanding, 
they also noted the increase in jobs that are “cognitively challenging 
and more stressful.”442  From 1971 to 2006, jobs that required “high 
cognitive ability and strong interpersonal skills grew from about one-
quarter to more than one-third.”443  Although cognitive skills 
involving “on-the-spot reasoning ability—independent of past 
experience—decline with age,” this decline is offset by the 
experience, communications skills, and acquired knowledge that older 
workers have.444  While older workers can perform in cognitively 
challenging jobs, such jobs may require continued on-the-job training, 
and employers tend to invest less effort in giving older workers 
training than they do for younger employees.445 
Of greater concern is that stressful working conditions have 
doubled from 1971 to 2006.446  The authors noted that “about 44 
percent of jobs involved some stress . . . and about 9 percent of 
workers were in high stress occupations.”447  While the decline in 
physically demanding jobs bodes well for the ability of American 
workers to retire later in life, the rise in stress levels raises concerns 
that higher stress could lead to earlier retirement by those who are 
able to afford to retire.448  Moreover, higher stress might lead to 
physical health problems,449 which, if true, suggests that workers in 
such jobs may find it increasingly difficult to continue to work at 
older ages because of physical limitations. 
While there has been a decrease in physically demanding jobs, the 
shift away from manufacturing to a professional services economy 
has occurred not only because of technological advances but also 
because of increased trade and outsourcing to other countries where 
unskilled labor is cheaper.450  These trends have affected the demand 
 
442 Id. at vii. 
443 Id. 
444 Id. 
445 Id. at 15. 
446 Id. at 11. 
447 Id. at vi. 
448 Id. at 15. 
449 The link between physical health and stress is still a subject of debate among 
researchers.  See David Watson & James W. Pennebaker, Health Complaints, Stress, and 
Distress: Exploring the Central Role of Negative Affectivity, 96 PSYCHOL. REV. 234 
(1989). 
450 TILL VON WACHTER, THE EFFECT OF LABOR MARKET TRENDS ON THE INCENTIVES 
AND INCIDENCE FOR CLAIMING SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS EARLY 6 (2009). 
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for unskilled labor.451  Even if older Americans have the capacity to 
work, one important question is whether they have the ability to find 
employment. 
C.  Ability to Find Employment 
While the unemployment rate among older Americans is lower 
than that of the general population, seniors find it significantly more 
difficult to find work when they are displaced.  Older workers have a 
lower unemployment rate than the general population.452  The rate for 
workers aged fifty-one to seventy-two fluctuates between “46 and 87 
percent of the general unemployment rate.”453  While the 
unemployment rate for the elderly increases as people age, it is still 
generally below that of the larger population.  In 2004, workers who 
were approaching early retirement (ages fifty-seven to sixty-one) had 
a 2.6% unemployment rate, while workers aged sixty-two to sixty-
seven had a 2.8% unemployment rate, and workers aged sixty-eight to 
seventy-two had a 3.2% rate.454  These were all below the general 
unemployment rate of 5.5%,455 though the increase is still 
“nontrivial.”456  A partial explanation for the traditionally lower 
unemployment rate might be that older workers who also have 
seniority on the job may have some protection from large-scale 
layoffs by “implicit or explicit seniority rules.”457 
However, one important exception to the generally lower 
unemployment rate for older workers is the early baby boomer cohort 
of workers aged fifty-one to fifty-six in 2004, which faced higher 
unemployment than “earlier cohorts at the same age.” 458  This group 
experienced an unemployment rate far nearer to the general 
population of 4.8% during 2004, prompting researchers to suggest 
“that job search by older workers is an issue of growing salience.”459  
Other indicators suggest that patterns may be changing.  As a result of 
 
451 Id. 
452 The general population would be counted as persons sixteen years or older who have 
a job or are actively looking for work.  See Li, supra note 196, at 65. 
453 Id. at 84. 
454 Id. at 109 tbl.3.1. 
455 Id. 
456 Id. at 84. 
457 VON WACHTER, supra note 450, at 6. 
458 Li, supra note 196, at 84–85. 
459 Id. at 85. 
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the subprime financial crisis, unemployment among older workers 
increased dramatically between December 2007 and August 2010—
rising 128.1% among workers fifty-five and older compared with an 
increase of 107.3% among workers aged twenty-five to fifty-four.460 
Some analysts contend that demographic trends may result in an 
increased demand for older workers, thus making it easier for older 
workers to find employment.  Given the aging population, the demand 
for labor—assuming it stays constant—will have to be satisfied by 
older workers.461 
While the unemployment rate for older workers is lower than that 
of the population at large, displaced older workers have a more 
difficult time finding new employment.462  The probability of finding 
replacement work declines significantly at age sixty and progressively 
grows worse.463  While there is a 55% chance of finding new work 
for displaced workers at ages fifty-five to fifty-nine, the rate drops to 
43% for workers aged sixty to sixty-four.464  Those over seventy have 
only a 26% chance of finding new work.465  In sharp contrast, 
younger workers (ages twenty to sixty-five) have a success rate that 
ranges from 89.6% to 96.8%.466 
A variety of factors affect the success rate, including whether the 
worker is seeking full- or part-time employment, similarity with 
previous employment, job search techniques, and wage rate sought. 
Full-time v. Part-time Employment: Those searching for full-time 
work were more successful (59%) than those who wanted part-time 
work (39%), which has led researchers to suggest that a mismatch 
exists in the labor market between the reduced hours older workers 
desire and employers’ needs.467  On the other hand, as job seekers 
near and then become eligible for Social Security, the success rate for 
finding part-time work eclipses the success rate for full-time 
employment.  For those aged sixty-five to sixty-nine, the success rate 
 
460 Susan Bisom-Rapp et al., Decent Work, Older Workers, and Vulnerability in the 
Economic Recession: A Comparative Study of Australia, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States, 15 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. (forthcoming 2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1699447. 
461 CUTLER, supra note 328, at 2. 
462 Johnson & Mermin, supra note 279, at 3. 
463 Li, supra note 196, at 88. 
464 Id. 
465 Id. 
466 Id. at 89. 
467 Id. at 87. 
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for seeking part-time work was 72.5%, whereas the full-time success 
rate was only 7.8%.468 
Similarity with previous employment: Naturally, those workers 
seeking a job that is similar to previous employment are more 
competitive because of their experience and therefore have a higher 
rate of success (53.1%) than those seeking different work (47.4%).469  
For oldest workers (those seventy and above) the difference is more 
pronounced—44.2% (seeking same job type) versus 25.6% (seeking 
different job type).470 
Job search techniques: The declining rate of employment success 
as workers age may simply be due to the effort that workers put into 
their job search.  Fewer job search strategies are used as workers age, 
and older workers are less likely to put their own resources into 
finding work than mid-career workers.471  Additionally, older job 
seekers may not have social networks as robust as those of younger 
job seekers, thus leading to lost opportunities.472 
High wages: One common explanation for the low hiring rate is 
that older workers demand a higher wage than younger workers.473  
Older workers generally demand a higher salary to work if they 
ascribe a high value to leisure, have other income, or possess a great 
deal of work experience in the field.474  However, some studies show 
that the median wage that older job seekers would accept is lower 
than the median wage of previously accepted employment, thereby 
suggesting that employers may be rejecting older workers for other 
reasons.475 
The factors that make for success in a job search at an older age do 
not appear to be much different than those at any other age.  It should 
come as no surprise that the people within the older workforce who 
find employment are healthier, are younger, are better educated, score 
higher on cognition tests, have longer work histories, have shorter 
absences since the last job, and are more likely to have worked as a 
 
468 Id. at 111 tbl.3.3. 
469 Id. at 110 tbl.3.2. 
470 Id. at 111 tbl.3.3. 
471 See id. 
472 Id. at 99. 
473 See id. at 92–94. 
474 Id. at 94. 
475 Id. 
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manager in a profession or the services industry.476  Whites are more 
successful than other races.477 
Increasingly, displaced workers who do find work have returned to 
the workforce with lower salaries than their previous job.  The Bureau 
of Labor Statistics reported in a January 2010 survey that only 45% of 
workers displaced from their long-term jobs were earning as much or 
more than they did in their previous jobs, which is down from 55% in 
2008.478 
D.  Age Discrimination in the Workplace 
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)479 prohibits 
job discrimination on the basis of age for most workers age forty or 
over in companies that employ twenty or more people.480  Even with 
legal protections, there is a widely held belief that age discrimination 
exists.481 
Studies, however, differ on the extent of age discrimination in the 
workplace.  Some conclude that older workers are more choosey 
about their employment.482  In sharp contrast, Lahey found that 
younger women had over a 40% better chance at getting an interview 
than older women who had equivalent skills.483  Employers may have 
preconceived notions that older workers lack energy, have higher 
salary expectations, will cost more in health care, and may bring a law 
suit based on discrimination if they are fired—among others.484  Age 
discrimination claims are on the rise.  Since 1998, the number of age 
discrimination claims received by the EEOC has increased 61%.485 
Notwithstanding the protections afforded by the ADEA, “[r]ecent 
US Supreme Court decisions have weakened the ADEA’s protections, 
making it more difficult to prove age discrimination than other forms 
 
476 Id. at 96–97. 
477 Id. at 96. 
478 Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Worker Displacement: 2007–2009 (Aug. 
26, 2010), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/disp.nr0.htm. 
479 Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 623, 631 (2006). 
480 Id. 
481 LAHEY, supra note 156, at 2. 
482 Id. 
483 Joanna N. Lahey, Age, Women, and Hiring: An Experimental Study, 43 J. HUM. 
RESOURCES 30, 31 (2008). 
484 LAHEY, supra note 156, at 4 tbl.1. 
485 Bisom-Rapp et al., supra note 460, at 50. 
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of discrimination.”486  In Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., the 
U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the ADEA to require that employees 
bringing an age discrimination lawsuit “establish that age was the 
‘but-for’ cause of the employer’s adverse action.”487  The ruling 
established that the ADEA requires a higher evidentiary standard than 
Title VII federal antidiscrimination laws, which provide relief if “[the 
plaintiff’s membership in a protected class] played a motivating part 
in an employment decision.”488  Commentators have noted that the 
Court’s ruling in Gross “has made it more difficult for plaintiffs to 
prove age discrimination under the ADEA.”489  After the Supreme 
Court’s ruling, bills were introduced in both the House and Senate to 
amend the ADEA490 to lessen the evidentiary standard and bring it in 
line with the evidentiary standards found in Title VII claims.491 
Other recent U.S. Supreme Court rulings have also raised the bar 
for plaintiffs seeking to prove age discrimination.  In Kentucky 
Retirement Systems v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 
the Court required that plaintiffs show not only that age was a factor 
in the alleged discrimination but also that there was discriminatory 
animus by the employer492—a more difficult burden that “may doom 
many ADEA claims.”493  In Smith v. City of Jackson,494 the Court 
made it easier for companies to defend against disparate impact 
ADEA claims by adopting “the reasonable factor other than age 
defense.”495 
 
486 Id. at 48. 
487 Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2351 (2009). 
488 Id. at 2349 (alteration in original) (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 
228, 258 (1989)). 
489 Michael Foreman, Gross v. FBL Financial Services—Oh So Gross!, 40 U. MEM. L. 
REV. 681, 688 (2010). 
490 H.R. 3721, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 1756, 111th Cong. (2009). 
491 The Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act would amend the ADEA 
so that  
a plaintiff establishes an unlawful employment practice if the plaintiff 
demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) an impermissible 
factor or authority was a motivating factor for the practice complained of, even if 
other factors also motivated that practice; or (2) the practice complained of 
would not have occurred in the absence of an impermissible factor.   
S. 1756: CRS Summary, LIBR. CONG., http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111 
:SN01756:@@@D&summ2=m& (last visited Feb. 13, 2011). 
492 Ky. Ret. Sys. v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, 554 U.S. 135, 149–50 (2008). 
493 Bisom-Rapp et al., supra note 460, at 49. 
494 Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005). 
495 Bisom-Rapp et al., supra note 460, at 49. 
TEMPLIN 5/2/2011  11:17 AM 
2011] Social Security Reform 1245 
E.  Conclusions 
The decision on whether to retire or stay in the labor force is likely 
the result of many factors, including some that are not affected by the 
economic incentives built into the Social Security Act.496  It may be 
that people start claiming benefits early because they expect the 
system to collapse in the near future.  Many polls have shown that the 
public does not have confidence in the Social Security financing 
system.  An AARP poll showed that only 35% of the respondents 
expressed any degree of confidence in the future of the Social 
Security system.497  A Gallup poll reported that 60% of non-retirees 
who responded believed they will get no Social Security benefits 
when they retire, and 56% of retirees believed that their benefits will 
be cut.498 
It is not surprising that the public has doubts.  The political 
discourse on Social Security since the late 1970s has focused on the 
threat to Social Security given the baby boom generation, declining 
birth rates, and longer life expectancies.  A natural response to the 
fear over Social Security financing would be a “run on the bank” 
mentality—to start claiming benefits early in order to get what one 
can out of the system while there is still money in the trust fund to 
pay benefits. 
A few trends are clear from the employment statistics.  Older 
workers reentering the workforce generally have lower salaries than 
they had at their previous employer.  Additionally, successful job 
seekers “are less likely to have sources of subsidized health insurance 
other than from an employer,”499 which suggests an urgent 
motivation to find employment.  Li speculates that unsuccessful job 
searchers who have health insurance not based on employment might 
end their job searches early “because the value of a new job is lower 
for them.”500  To the extent that the FRA is increased, the government 
should also seek to increase resources for older Americans in finding 
employment.  This might include creating incentives for businesses to 
take on part-time workers or providing job-seeking resources. 
 
496 See MacInnis, supra note 126, at 18–19. 
497 AARP, SOCIAL SECURITY 75TH ANNIVERSARY SURVEY REPORT: PUBLIC OPINION 
TRENDS 18 (2010). 
498 Frank Newport, Six in 10 Workers Hold No Hope of Receiving Social Security, 
GALLUP (July 20, 2010), http://www.gallup.com/poll/141449/six-workers-hold-no-hope     
-receiving-social-security.aspx. 
499 Li, supra note 196, at 97. 
500 Id. at 98. 
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VIII 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Increasing the retirement age is a reasonable response to Social 
Security’s deficit given demographic, economic, and societal trends.  
Americans are healthier and living longer, and the shift from a 
manufacturing to a service economy allows even low-skilled workers 
options to extend their work lives.  While American society can 
absorb an increase in the full retirement age, that doesn’t mean that it 
is the best choice to fix Social Security’s financing problems or 
ensure an adequate retirement.  There is much to be gained from 
having workers stay in the labor force longer—including increased 
retirement savings and overall increases in productivity.  However, 
increasing the FRA alone—without an increase in the EEA—actually 
creates a wider pool of people accepting reduced benefits because 
people tend to retire at the earliest age possible.  The current 
maximum age of sixty-seven aligns with the norm being established 
in most other OECD countries and also stands as a midpoint in old 
age where the decline in health starts to accelerate.  Studies show that 
work capacity begins a sharp decline between ages of sixty-five and 
seventy-five.501  Rather than increase the FRA, a better way to keep 
people in the workforce longer would be to raise the EEA and then 
create incentives to encourage working later in life by making 
adjustments to the RET and DRC. 
As for Social Security’s solvency problem, there are other 
solutions that could be put in place, such as raising the maximum 
limit of the payroll tax, diversifying the trust fund, and changing cost-
of-living adjustments.  The rest of this Part discusses various policy 
alternatives that would achieve three goals: increase personal savings 
to reduce longevity risk, provide incentives to retire later in life, and 
address Social Security’s solvency problems. 
A.  Raise the Early Eligibility Age 
One problem created by the 1983 Amendments was that the Early 
Eligibility Age was not scheduled to increase in sync with and at the 
same rate as increases in the FRA.  Consequently, cohorts subject to 
an increased FRA are also in line for reduced benefits at the earliest 
 
501 At age fifty-five, work capacity is 75% and decreases to only 69% by age sixty-five. 
However, for the ten-year difference between ages sixty-five and seventy-five, work 
capacity falls more rapidly so that it is 60% by age seventy-five.  See supra note 421 and 
accompanying text. 
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acceptance age of sixty-two.  This creates the problem of ever greater 
reductions in benefits for early claimers.  Given recent studies in 
behavioral economics, it stands to reason that, if people are given the 
choice to retire at sixty-two, they will do so even if it is not rational. 
Behavioral economics tells us that people do not always act in 
ways that maximize their economic self-interest.502  One set of 
behavioral patterns—termed hyperbolic discounting—occurs when 
people intend to sacrifice an immediate reward for a longer-term gain 
but do not follow through with the sacrifice when actually faced with 
the choice.503  In the decision of when to elect benefits, many workers 
may be doing so because of the immediacy of the reward, even 
though it is not in their best long-term interest to do so. 
Behavioral economics also shows that “visceral factors can lead 
individuals to choose the option that offers instant gratification” when 
the option is in close proximity.504  At age sixty-two, the decision of 
whether to retire is a complex one involving the state of finances, 
health, employment, and other factors.  Given that most workers at 
age sixty-two have been working since their early twenties, it is likely 
a decision fueled by emotional content.  The appearance of an instant 
benefit—especially to lower income workers—may be too difficult to 
resist. 
Raising the EEA as a paternalistic response to dysfunctional 
economic behavior will force workers to stay in the labor force longer 
than anticipated.  Increasing the EEA is a reform that will likely have 
a greater effect in terms of labor force participation than raising the 
FRA.  While raising the FRA will likely cause some increase in labor 
force participation rates, the effect is uncertain given the different 
factors involved in the retirement decision.505  Raising the EEA will 
likely be more effective at keeping older workers in the labor force 
because it gives no choice as to when a worker starts receiving 
benefits.  The upside is significant in that workers reduce their 
longevity risk (the risk of outliving one’s savings and benefits) 
because their Social Security benefits will increase, and they will 
have additional years in the workforce for an opportunity to save and 
reduce the span upon which they will draw upon their resources. 
 
502 Knoll, supra note 311, at 1. 
503 Id. at 9. 
504 Id. at 10. 
505 See supra Part VI.A (discussing the effect of raising the FRA on labor force 
participation rates). 
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For the same reasons that the FRA could be extended (increased 
longevity, improved health, etc.), so too can the EEA be raised.  
Furthermore, an EEA increase would apply to workers at an age 
where they have a higher capacity to work than the age being 
considered for increases to the FRA.  More workers will have a 
greater capacity to work at sixty-three or sixty-four (assuming an 
increase of two years in the EEA) than they do at ages ranging 
between sixty-seven and seventy, when capacity to work begins a 
more rapid decline. 
Increasing the EEA will be more difficult politically than 
increasing the FRA.  The EEA of sixty-two has been in place for both 
men and women since the 1960s.506  Many Americans have focused 
on age sixty-two as the first opportunity to receive benefits and 
possibly retire.  Moreover, increasing the EEA doesn’t have the same 
amount of political clout as increasing the FRA because doing so will 
not help reduce the Social Security deficit.507  However, an increase 
in the EEA could result in an increase in general income tax revenues 
of as much as $170 billion and reduce the Social Security deficit by 
2% if everyone able to work delays retirement by one year.508  While 
such revenue would go into the general budget rather than the Social 
Security budget, the combined additional revenue represents a 28% 
reduction of the Social Security shortfall.509 
Opponents principally argue that some workers will slip into 
poverty—a likely possibility.510  Unfortunately, when dealing with 
large populations and crafting general rules that apply to all, there are 
some subpopulations that may suffer.  These harms can be mitigated 
by expanding disability under SSDI and using means-based programs, 
such as SSI, to compensate for lost wages.  To the extent that means-
based programs do not suffice, many innovative ideas that leverage 
the Social Security system have been suggested. 
One idea is an elastic EEA that would allow early eligibility for 
groups with short life expectancies.511  Under this model, lifetime 
earnings would be used to identify workers with low life 
expectancies.  Researchers found a strong correlation between 
 
506 Moore, supra note 18, at 551. 
507 See supra notes 235–38 and accompanying text. 
508 See supra note 240 and accompanying text. 
509 BUTRICA, SMITH & STEUERLE, supra note 230, at 17. 
510 See supra notes 232–34. 
511 ZHIVAN ET AL., supra note 232, at 1. 
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lifetime earnings and the factors that generally indicate a low life 
expectancy, such as “lack of financial assets, fair or poor health, low 
educational attainment, [and] low subjective life expectancy.”512  
Using lifetime earnings as a measure, the EEA can be automatically 
adjusted so that the EEA would remain at sixty-two for those with 
average indexed earnings (AIE) of 50% or less of the national 
average.513  For workers who have an AIE that is equal to or greater 
than the national average, the EEA would be sixty-four.  Anyone with 
an AIE between 50% and 100% of the national average would have 
an EEA that is scaled between sixty-two and sixty-four based on the 
percentage of their AIE relative to the national average.514  Workers 
would be notified of their EEA at age fifty-five, once they have a 
history of earnings long enough to establish their projected AIE.515  
One weakness in this approach is that the AIE calculation does not 
take into account other sources of earnings or wealth, such as income 
earned abroad by foreign workers or workers employed by state and 
local governments that are not subject to Social Security516 and some 
earnings made by self-employed workers which are currently tax-
exempt.517  Consequently, someone with a low AIE who is otherwise 
wealthy might be able to start early claiming at sixty-two despite the 
policy objective to exclude those individuals. 
Another possibility is establishing a low level adjudication process 
that allows an exception for poor health or financial exigency so that 
certain low income workers can begin to receive the same level of 
benefits that they would have received had the EEA not been 
increased.  The Fiscal Commission proposed such a hardship 
exception to its increases in the EEA and FRA and suggested that the 
SSA develop eligibility criteria to administer the exception.518 
The system needs to be somewhat efficient in order to avoid 
unnecessary costs.  For example, if a worker pleads health problems 
and financial exigency, he may—upon providing proof—elect to 
receive the same level of benefit that he would have received if the 
 
512 Id. at 4. 
513 Id. at 5. 
514 Id. 
515 Id. 
516 Id. at 4. 
517 Richard Winchester, The Gap in the Employment Tax Gap, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 127, 127–28 (2009) (proposing to close some of the exemptions from the 
employment tax). 
518 FISCAL COMM’N, THE MOMENT OF TRUTH, supra note 2, at 50–51. 
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EEA had not been increased.  While this requires an adjudication of 
each individual’s situation, the level of proof could be established by 
requiring that applicants make a pleading under the penalty of 
perjury.  The process could be streamlined so that, upon a showing of 
low lifetime earnings and the inclusion of an applicant in some at-risk 
groups, the lower EEA would be granted.  Investigators could search 
IRS and other records to identify applicants who perjure themselves.  
That said, due process requires that administrative adjudication have 
an appeal process; consequently, there are likely to be additional costs 
to process appeals for those denied a lower EEA. 
Although raising the EEA does not help solve the financing 
problem, it prevents workers from making poor economic decisions 
by claiming too early.  Congress should also create incentives to 
encourage workers to retire later and, to the extent that an individual 
claims early, to stay in the workforce. 
B.  Creating Incentives to Retire Later 
Even though behavioral economics teaches us that individuals do 
not always act in their own economic self-interest, policy makers can 
influence individual decision making through a process called choice 
architecture.519  As choice architects, policy makers design and 
engineer the decision environment in order to achieve a more positive 
outcome.520  Policy makers are in a unique position to recreate a 
Social Security system that encourages employment at later stages by 
eliminating both the real and perceived disincentives to work later in 
life. 
The current system has disincentives to stay in the labor force.  
According to one study, the structure of Social Security, federal 
income taxes, and the laws surrounding employee benefits create an 
implicit tax that increases as people age—rising for men from 14% 
for a fifty-five-year-old to about 50% at age seventy.521  Removing 
the disincentives and creating new incentives to work longer 
generates income for individuals, reduces the years they are drawing 
 
519 Knoll, supra note 311, at 14. 
520 Id. 
521 Barbara A. Butrica et al., The Implicit Tax on Work at Older Ages, 59 NAT’L TAX J. 
211, 229 tbl.7 (2006).  One example of the implicit tax would be the half of the payroll tax 
that employers pay for any given employee.  The authors contend that employers pay 
lower salaries as a result of this cost of doing business; thus they conclude that “workers 
ultimately pay the entire payroll tax themselves.”  Id. at 213–14. 
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on personal savings during retirement, and improves the overall 
economy by raising output.522 
1.  Eliminate the Retirement Earnings Test 
The retirement earnings test (RET) is widely considered (whether 
accurate or not) a disincentive to stay in the labor force for workers 
who claim benefits early.  Workers reduce their hours or quit their 
jobs when the RET applies, and then they increase their employment 
when they reach their FRA and the test is no longer applicable.  As a 
group, it makes more economic sense for workers to retain their jobs 
if claiming early because they will retain their seniority and continue 
to have an income that may provide additional savings.  Seniors who 
quit or lose their jobs generally have a more difficult time finding new 
work and, when they do, have lower salaries.  In 2000, Congress 
removed the RET for those who had reached their FRA.  It should 
consider removing the RET entirely in order to create incentives for 
workers to stay in the labor force. 
2.  Increase Benefits for Retiring After the FRA 
Currently, the marginal returns for some men to extend their 
employment are quite low.523  Part of the reason for this is that 
benefits are based on a worker’s AIME, which is an indexed average 
of the highest thirty-five years of earnings.524  An additional year of 
work does not increase the core PIA if the extra year does not exceed 
the lowest indexed earnings in a worker’s best thirty-five years.525  
Thus, increasing the AIME to include a worker’s forty highest years 
of earnings would improve the marginal returns for workers, and thus, 
act as an incentive to retire later.526 
Another proposal would be to increase the DRC.  Studies have also 
shown that prior increases in the DRC were insufficient to encourage 
the goal of creating incentives for later retirement, and calls have been 
made to craft other policies to achieve that goal.527  Increasing the 
DRC would provide more economic incentive for such workers to 
continue working and claim later.  Men with low earnings and women 
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who are not receiving spousal benefits have higher marginal returns 
under the current system,528 so any additional increase in the DRC 
would just increase the incentive already in place to stay employed 
and not to claim benefits. 
3.  Reduce Payroll Taxes for Older Workers 
Another effective method to increase labor force participation 
among older workers would be to reduce or eliminate the payroll tax 
on older workers.  Older workers are highly sensitive to incentives to 
work and would likely respond to a decrease in taxes by staying in the 
workforce.  In a widely cited study, Schmidt and Sevak found that a 
“10% [increase] in the after-tax return to work leads to increases in 
labor force participation of 7.5% among men and 11.4% among 
women.”529  The marginal returns for adding another year of work 
would also improve, not because of a benefit boost but because the 
cost to the employee of working is reduced through lower taxes.530 
While this approach results in less tax revenue for the government, 
it can build savings for older workers and delay their use of other 
resources.  A variety of approaches have been suggested as ways to 
reduce tax on older workers, including eliminating the payroll tax or 
adjusting the income tax rate for older worker through tax rebates.531  
While eliminating the payroll tax on older workers, such as those 
older than their FRA, would reduce revenue brought into the Social 
Security system, it would also increase employment among the 
elderly, thus increasing income tax revenue; therefore, the “reform 
would not necessarily reduce total tax revenue.”532 
4.  Other Incentives to Delay Retirement and Increase Savings 
Advancing the policy goal of encouraging a delayed retirement and 
increased savings could be pursued through government programs 
and agencies other than the Social Security Administration. 
For example, increasing the contribution amount for workers in 
401(k) and IRA plans and encouraging auto-enrollment in employer-
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based plans can improve savings rates dramatically for both low- and 
high-income workers.533  While 401(k) plans are run by corporations, 
the government creates the rules surrounding them and has the 
opportunity to influence how those plans are run so as to optimize 
savings.  For workers who do not have 401(k) plans or who lack 
steady employment, automatic IRA plans that would essentially allow 
workers to build savings through automatic payroll deductions have 
been proposed.534 
Additionally, some ERISA rules discourage phased retirement by 
requiring that workers with defined-benefit pensions retire or lose a 
portion of their wealth after a certain age.535 
C.  Alternatives to Address Social Security Solvency 
In order to address Social Security’s solvency issues, Congress 
should consider three other alternatives that would provide more 
financial stability to Social Security financing: (1) diversifying the 
trust fund, (2) revising the way in which cost-of-living adjustments 
are calculated, and (3) increasing the maximum limit on the payroll 
tax. 
First, diversifying the trust fund would involve moving the $2.5 
trillion currently held in government bonds into a portfolio that 
contained stocks, bonds, and other assets in order to gain a higher rate 
of return on the investment.  One study estimates that diversifying the 
trust fund to include investments in a broad-based index (such as the 
Wilshire 5000) could eliminate as much as one-third of the deficit.536  
Over the long term, this proposal could help address the funding 
issues and do so in a way that minimizes tax hikes and benefit cuts.  
While there has been strong opposition to government investment of 
the Social Security Trust Fund,537 that opposition is largely based on 
fears that politicians will interfere in corporate governance.538  
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Despite problems that developed with government interference under 
the TARP program,539 legal structures and norms could be formulated 
to keep politicians out of the investment decision.540 
Second, changing the automatic cost-of-living adjustments 
(COLAs) for Social Security benefits could reduce the deficit by 
26%.541  A retiree’s Social Security benefits are automatically 
increased by increases in the Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer 
Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W).  
The Bureau of Labor and Statistics developed a different measure of 
inflation (the chained CPI) that it says is more accurate in 
approximating increases in the cost of goods and services.542  The 
chained CPI is anticipated “to increase about 0.3 percent slower each 
year than the CPI-W,” thereby decreasing anticipated benefit 
payments and increasing trust fund solvency.543  The proposal has 
support from both Democrats and Republicans and was one of the 
reforms endorsed by the Fiscal Commission.544  Interestingly, 
adopting a different measure of COLA is a reform that spreads the 
benefit cut widely across all generations, unlike retirement age 
increases that target particular cohorts.545 
Third, increasing the taxable maximum to cover 90% of earnings is 
a reform that has considerable support,546 including that of the Fiscal 
Commission, which proposed it as one of a set of reforms.547  
Currently, the employment tax that serves as the primary funding 
mechanism for Social Security applies only to the first $106,800 of 
income.  The CBO estimates that raising the cap to 90% of payroll 
would increase it to $156,000.548  This proposal would improve the 
shortfall by 0.75% of payroll and reduce the long-term deficit by 
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37.5%.549  The Fiscal Commission proposes a gradual phase-in period 
and estimates the savings to be 35%.550 
Increasing the taxable cap is a suitable compromise solution 
because the higher tax will be partially offset by higher benefits.  This 
proposal has support from influential groups.  The AFL-CIO’s 
Deputy Policy Director Kelly Ross mentioned it as one solution in his 
comments in House hearings in July 2010.551  A National Academy 
of Social Insurance survey showed that 83% of the respondents 
favored raising the tax cap, whereas only 58% favored an across-the-
board tax rate increase.552  Other polls support these results.  A 
Gallup poll showed that 63% of those surveyed thought an increase in 
the retirement age was a bad idea, while 67% in the same sample 
thought increasing taxes to cover all of the higher income workers’ 
wages was a good idea.553  An AARP survey found that 85% of those 
surveyed opposed cutting Social Security benefits as a way to cure the 
federal deficit.554  The survey also shows that 57% of those under 
fifty years of age support reform that would boost tax revenues now 
in order to ensure that they receive the same level of benefits when 
they retire as are available today.555  The polls and surveys serve as 
evidence of one well-accepted characteristic of Social Security—i.e., 
the entitlement has created a large constituency that will seek to 
protect its interest.556  Americans view Social Security as an “earned 
right” rather than charity.557  While the electorate has often been 
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characterized as apathetic, beneficiaries to Social Security act 
decisively when the system is threatened.558 
CONCLUSION 
The solvency of the Social Security system is one of most pressing 
issues facing policy makers, and reforms should be made sooner than 
later.  Increasing the full retirement age improves the solvency of the 
system, and most workers can stay in the labor force longer given 
improved health and longevity and a reduction in physically 
demanding jobs.  However, increasing the full retirement age does not 
necessarily mean that workers will retire later.  The behavioral 
economics literature confirms what we know intuitively—that people 
are not always rational economic actors.  Although demographic, 
economic, and societal trends allow workers to stay in the labor force 
longer, many retire at their first opportunity of sixty-two, even if it is 
not in their long-term economic interest to do so.  Any change to the 
retirement age should start with an increase in the early eligibility age 
from sixty-two to sixty-four—a reform that will increase workers’ 
benefits and lessen the risk of poverty in retirement.  While increasing 
the early retirement age from sixty-two to sixty-four would positively 
affect retirement income, policy makers need not increase the full 
retirement age beyond sixty-seven in order to address Social Security 
solvency.  A number of alternative proposals—such as changing 
COLA calculations, increasing the taxable maximum to 90% of 
earnings, and diversifying trust fund investments—would also 
improve Social Security’s financing.  Even so, policy makers should 
do everything they can to encourage older workers to stay in the labor 
force.  By removing disincentives to work and improving existing 
incentives to retire later, Congress has the ability to form a cohesive 
retirement policy that rewards Americans for working late into life. 
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